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Abstract 
Even as audit regulators push for increased use of professional judgment in the audit of 
complex financial statement accounts, auditors seem to interpret audit standards as increasingly 
prescriptive. This leads to mechanical, or check-the-box audit decisions in just those situations in 
which it is most important to make decisions based on professional judgment. In response, 
regulators can, and do, issue new audit standards with a focus on providing auditors with 
guidelines instead of bright-lines, though those new standards often contain additional examples, 
definitions, and guidance which may be perceived as prescriptive. I conduct an experiment using 
practicing auditor participants to evaluate the joint effect of prescriptive versus judgment-based 
audit standards which allow auditors to use professional judgment without additional constraints, 
and systems- versus reductionist-thinking perspectives on auditor decisions related to complex 
estimates. My results indicate that introduction of a judgment-based standard is not sufficient, by 
itself, to decrease auditors’ check-the-box mentality. As expected, however, auditors who adopt a 
systems-thinking perspective are better able to apply both the prescriptive and judgment-based 
standards, resulting in less check-the-box decisions related to material misstatement decisions, 
but not to material weakness decisions. I find evidence that the systems-thinking perspective 
changes how auditors incorporate business process complexity into their audit planning process 
and changes how they perceive management’s role, relative to the role of process complexity 
itself, in potential accounting errors. These results suggest a potential limit to the ability to 
reduce auditors’ check-the-box mentality and increase their use of professional judgment by 
simply introducing more judgment-based standards. These results also suggest, however, that the 
goal of improving professional judgment may be achieved with an underlying change to the way 
auditors’ think, whether standards are prescriptive or more judgment-based. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In this study, I investigate how audit standard type (prescriptive versus judgment-based) 
and auditors’ thinking perspectives (systems-thinking versus reductionist-thinking) jointly 
influence the extent to which auditors make check-the-box decisions related to complex 
accounting estimates. I develop and test, in an experiment using professional auditors and a rich 
auditing case study, context-based predictions. For example, based on the facts of the case 
study I developed for the experiment, and the audit standard manipulation, participants in the 
more prescriptive standard condition should conclude that there is a greater likelihood of a 
material misstatement of the financial statements than should those in the judgment-based 
standard. Furthermore, participants with lesser check-the-box thinking (systems-thinkers) 
should better incorporate the facts within the case study to judge an even greater likelihood of 
material misstatement under the prescriptive standard and an even lower likelihood under the 
judgment-based standard.  
Professional judgment is an increasingly critical aspect of financial statement audit 
decision-making as business and accounting become increasingly complex (e.g., Palmrose 
2009). However, accounting researchers, practitioners, and regulators continue to document 
concerns that auditors seem to “go through the motions as defined by standards,” instead of 
applying careful professional judgment, and believe their decisions to be justified as a result 
(Bratten, Gaynor, McDaniel, Montague, & Sierra 2013, pg. 23; Schipper 2003). These so-
called check-the-box decisions are particularly concerning in audit areas with high uncertainty, 
like fair values and other complex estimates (e.g., Brody, Lowe, & Pany 2003; Christensen, 
Glover, & Wood 2012). Management estimates often have highly variable outcomes and 
neither management nor the auditor truly knows how correct the estimate is at the time of the 
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audit. The auditor’s task in these cases is often to determine how well justified the estimate is, 
not how correct it is. Regulators expect auditors to use professional judgment, precisely in these 
situations, to evaluate risks to investors based on audit results – not to make check-the-box 
decisions based on a series of bright-line rules (e.g., PCAOB 2005; 2007b). 
To reduce auditors’ check-the-box mentality, standard-setters can, and do, implement 
audit standards that suggest guidelines and points of consideration, instead of prescriptive 
bright-lines (e.g., PCAOB 2007a; 2007b). Interestingly, evidence suggests that audit standards 
are actually becoming more prescriptive, or are implemented prescriptively by practitioners 
(e.g., Wedemeyer 2010; Palmrose 2013). One likely reason for this seeming contradiction is 
that the requirement to consider multiple definitions, examples, and guidelines increases the 
complexity of the decision (Wood 1986). When faced with complex decisions, people tend to 
break the decision into its component parts, consider each component separately, then linearly 
combine the component decisions (e.g., Wood & Bandura 1989; Senge 1990). In the audit 
context, this suggests that guidelines are likely interpreted as prescriptive requirements, each 
guideline evaluated separately, in a check-the-box fashion.   
Some audit researchers and practitioners suggest that increased use of professional 
auditor judgment can be achieved through audit methodologies that focus on understanding 
business risk and process complexity (e.g., Knechel 2007; Bell, Solomon, and Peecher 2005), 
and by allowing the auditor to use well-justified professional judgment. There is, however, 
some question as to whether today’s audit professionals have developed the skills necessary to 
execute such an approach (Power 2007). Research in system dynamics provides a potential 
intervention to induce those skills. Individuals adopting a systems-thinking perspective better 
understand complexity and incorporate that complexity into their problem-solving and 
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decision-making (e.g., Senge 1990; O’Connor & McDermott 1997). Systems-thinking helps an 
individual understand the whole, not just individual parts of a pattern or process. Systems-
thinking also helps individuals recognize interactions between multiple processes, and non-
linear cause-and-effect (Senge 1990; Frank 2000). Reductionist-thinking, on the other hand, 
causes people to focus on the individual parts of the process. I argue that auditors adopting 
elements of systems-thinking will be better able to incorporate the complexity of the 
accounting process into their judgments under both types of standard, and will also be better 
able to overcome and incorporate the additional complexity introduced by judgment-based 
standards, reducing check-the-box decisions under both standards. I expect that systems-
thinking auditors make audit decisions less consistent with check-the-box mentality, and more 
consistent with professional judgment, than do non-systems-thinking auditors. 
For this study, I employ a 2×2 between subjects ×2 within subjects (repeated measures) 
mixed experimental design using professional auditors. I test the joint influence of audit 
standard prescriptiveness and thinking perspective in a setting where auditors determine the 
materiality of potential misstatements to complex accounting estimates – where current 
standards are relatively prescriptive, despite dealing with a highly subjective concept. I 
operationalize audit standard prescriptiveness by manipulating whether participants are asked 
to determine materiality under current audit standards (the more prescriptive standard 
condition), or under a hypothetical, more judgment-based standard. The current standard 
requires a quantitative materiality threshold be set, such that any misstatement larger than that 
threshold must be considered a material misstatement. This standard also allows auditors to 
consider a difference from management’s estimate that is smaller than this threshold to be 
material, based on qualitative factors; qualitative factors can be used uni-directionally (PCAOB 
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2010b). Under the hypothetical judgment-based standard, the auditor also has the flexibility to 
judge that a difference larger than the quantitative threshold is immaterial based on qualitative 
factors; qualitative factors can be used bi-directionally.
1
 I also manipulate whether the 
participants receive an intervention to induce certain elements of systems-thinking versus 
reductionist-thinking. This intervention is a series of pointers to assist participants to develop 
their mental models of account balances, and how they might audit those balances. For my 
primary measure of audit decision-making, I ask my participants to make initial and final 
material misstatement conclusions for a complex warranty reserve account balance. I follow 
this up by asking them to make initial and final material weakness conclusions for internal 
controls over financial reporting (ICFR). 
Consistent with predictions, this study provides evidence that the difference between 
prescriptive and judgment-based audit standards is not sufficient, by itself, to cause a 
significant difference in check-the-box decisions. Systems-thinking auditors made significantly 
different material misstatement decisions under prescriptive and judgment-based standards, 
consistent with the application of professional judgment. For reductionist-thinking auditors, 
though, there is no significant difference between material misstatement conclusions under 
prescriptive standards and judgment-based standards, suggesting that these participants did not 
judgmentally consider qualitative factors in determining materiality under the judgment-based 
standard, and/or did not recognize the effect of complexity under both standards. This latter 
result is therefore consistent with application of check-the-box decisions. I find process 
evidence that the difference in decisions between auditors under different audit standards and 
with different thinking perspectives is at least partially due to their incorporation of process 
                                                          
1
 This manipulation is based loosely on a recommendation from an SEC Advisory Panel (the Advisory Committee 
on Improvements to Financial Reporting (2008), hereafter “the Pozen Committee”). 
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complexity into their audit decision processes. Results of  process tests suggest that systems-
thinkers (versus reductionist-thinkers) not only have a better understanding of the effects of 
process complexity on management’s ability to make reasonable accounting estimates, but also 
better understand the relation between that business process complexity and the audit process. 
Tests of material weakness decisions provide less evidence of systems-thinking reducing 
check-the-box thinking. The change in material weakness decision, as well as the final material 
weakness decision, is explained almost entirely by the participants’ material misstatement 
decisions, under all conditions. This suggests that the check-the-box thinking that compels 
auditors to conclude that a material weakness must exist when a material misstatement exists 
(and perhaps only when a material misstatement exists) requires additional research. It is 
possible, for example, that a stronger thinking perspective manipulation is required to affect 
this mentality. Alternately, it is possible that the link between material misstatements and 
material weaknesses introduces a type of complexity which requires a more pointed systems-
thinking manipulation than was included in my study. Still another possibility is that the audit 
standard manipulation, which was designed to affect how auditors determine the materiality of 
a financial statement error or difference, was simply not closely enough related to ICFR audit 
processes, in the minds of participants, to affect their ICFR judgments. Further research may be 
able to dig more deeply into these possibilities. 
The results of my study inform regulators, practitioners, and the academic literature. I 
show that, in the current audit environment, there are cognitive limits to the effectiveness of 
increased judgment-based audit standards. In this experiment, reductionist-thinking auditors 
showed limited difference in their propensity to exercise professional judgment whether under 
more prescriptive or more judgment-based audit standards. This result is consistent with 
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anecdotal evidence that regulatory inspectors continue to find deficiencies in auditors’ 
judgments related to complex estimates, even under standards that avoid bright-line 
requirements (e.g., Bratton 2004). My study suggests, however, that the increased use of 
professional judgment that the regulators intend to induce with these standards can be achieved 
if auditors have a relatively greater systems-thinking perspective, and this perspective can 
increase the use of professional judgment under prescriptive and judgment-based standards. 
This suggests that regulators can achieve their goals if audit practitioners and educators take 
certain steps to develop this perspective in audit professionals. Additionally, my study provides 
evidence that simple interventions that clearly explain systems-thinking concepts can 
significantly enhance auditors’ systems-thinking capabilities, at least with respect to material 
misstatement decisions. That is, the systems- and reductionist-thinking cues in my study were 
relatively minimal compared to those in prior research, yet study participants, most or all with 
several years of audit training, made significantly different conclusions depending upon their 
experimental condition. This suggests that practitioners may be able to induce systems-thinking 
using simple interventions, perhaps in the form of relatively non-intrusive audit decision aids to 
affect some decisions, though further research may be required to evaluate the limits of such 
simple interventions.  
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Chapter 2. Background – Auditing Complex Estimates and the 
Prescriptiveness of Accounting and Audit Standards 
Professional auditors evaluate the reasonableness of management’s complex estimates 
in the normal course of fieldwork (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012). This sometimes reveals 
evidence that a recorded estimate is likely incorrect. The auditors must then decide whether the 
recorded estimate is reasonable, conditioned on the information obtained during their 
procedures (PCAOB 2002). In this section, I describe how complexity can lead to check-the-
box decisions in the audit of complex accounting estimates, and describe evidence and 
outcomes of such decisions. I also describe previous research on the prescriptiveness of 
accounting and audit standards, and how those standards have been shown to affect auditor 
judgments. 
Early theoretical models of task-description decompose the complexity of a task or 
process into three primary dimensions: detail complexity, coordinative complexity, and 
dynamic complexity (e.g., Wood 1986). Detail complexity relates to the number of distinct acts 
and the number of distinct information cues required in the performance of those acts.
2
 
Coordinative complexity refers to “the nature of relationships between task inputs and task 
products” (Wood 1986, pg. 68). This can include the strength of the relationship between inputs 
and outputs, as well as sequencing of inputs, or whether relationships are linear, circular, etc. 
Finally, dynamic complexity relates to changes to the process over time. For the remainder of 
this document, coordinative complexity and dynamic complexity are collapsed into a single 
dynamic complexity dimension, to maintain consistency with the theories of system dynamics 
and business dynamics used hereafter (e.g., Senge 1990). 
                                                          
2
 Wood (1986) refers to this dimension as “component complexity”; however, to maintain consistency with system 
dynamics and business dynamics theories, the term “detail complexity” is used throughout this document. 
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Complex Accounting Estimates 
Complex accounting estimates are financial statement items for which measurement or 
valuation is, for some reason, uncertain, and for which management must employ 
computationally difficult models and/or consider multiple factors (PCAOB 2003; Griffith, 
Hammersley, & Kadous 2014). These complex estimates have become increasingly important 
and common in public company financial statements (Griffith et al. 2014; Christensen et al. 
2012). In the context of auditing complex accounting estimates, the detail complexity concept 
is relatively straightforward. It can be thought of as the number of rules required to be 
followed, the number of individual pieces of process or financial information to be considered 
within a model, the audit tasks to be performed, etc. Dynamic complexity, in this context, 
relates to subjective factors and assumptions that create uncertainty about the relevance of the 
estimate. These may include the extent to which the accounting estimate depends on 
management judgment, the sensitivity of the accounting estimate to changes in assumptions, 
the length of the forecast period, and the relevance of data drawn from past events to forecast 
future events (International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 2008). 
In their qualitative study of auditing of accounting estimates, Griffith et al. (2014) 
learned that auditors often adopt an approach whereby the individual assumptions used in 
management’s complex models are verified individually, in a check-the-box manner. “And in 
doing this, they sometimes fail to consider whether the assumptions fit together. So they may 
fail to notice inconsistencies among the assumptions and other available data. They may fail to 
notice that there's other data available … that contradicts some information that's being used in 
the estimate. They may overlook information that is not used in the estimate, but it's not 
included in the model at all as an assumption and perhaps should be” (PCAOB 2014, pg. 125). 
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In other words, when auditing complex accounting estimates, auditors seem to recognize and 
adjust for detail complexity by incorporating individual steps into their calculations of those 
estimates. They are less likely to recognize and adjust for the dynamic complexities associated 
with auditing complex accounting estimates, which may include factors such as the manner in 
which assumptions and related parties’ inputs affect one another, changes to assumptions over 
time, inconsistencies between management assumptions and market factors, etc. 
The Role of Audit Standards 
Previous accounting research shows evidence that elements within the audit task 
differently affect auditors’ judgments (see Nelson & Tan (2005) and Trotman, Tan, & Ang 
(2011) for reviews of this literature). One such task-related element is the prescriptiveness of 
accounting and audit standards. In addition to the detail and dynamic complexities associated 
with complex estimates themselves, auditors adhere to a comprehensive series of accounting 
and audit standards in the delivery of their services. In executing these services, audit 
professionals are often characterized as having a check-the-box mentality, or “going through 
the motions” to follow a series of rules, or perceived rules, based on those accounting and audit 
standards (e.g., Bratten et al. 2013; Demirkan, Feng, Mintchik, Pevzner, & Sierra 2013; Griffith 
et al. 2014).  
Evidence suggests that auditor check-the-box decisions played a significant role in 
various high-profile corporate failures in the early years of this century (Ball 2009). For 
example, analysis of Arthur Andersen’s audit of Enron’s special purpose entities (SPEs) 
suggests that the auditor prescriptively applied a rule of thumb regarding the percentage of 
capital invested by an outside investor. As a result, the auditor did not require Enron to 
consolidate its SPEs, effectively allowing the firm to hide over $1 billion in earnings 
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overstatements (Bratton 2004). In another display of check-the-box decisions related to 
complex accounting, Enron’s auditors passed on a potential $51 million misstatement to the 
firm’s financial statements in 1997 (i.e., did not require an adjustment), which represented 
almost 50% of that year’s income. An analysis of audit materiality guidelines in place at the 
time revealed that a bright-line interpretation supported the auditors’ judging the misstatement 
as immaterial, though professional judgment likely would have led to a much different decision 
(Brody et al. 2003).  
This rules-based check-the-box mentality is not a recent development, according to 
previous accounting research. In an analysis of the facts related to one of the biggest failures of 
the late 1980s’ savings and loan crisis, Erickson, Mayhew, & Felix (2000) report that the 
auditors of Lincoln Savings and Loan (LSL) allowed the financial institution to report millions 
of dollars in revenues related to land sales at a time and location in which market data showed 
significant market decline. The authors reviewed the auditors’ working papers and concluded 
that the auditors prescriptively followed the relevant accounting standard, SFAS No. 66, in 
form. However, the transactions associated with the land sale transactions were very complex 
and, in substance, should not have been considered revenue since the buyer was extremely 
unlikely to be able to repay the loan, which was indirectly financed through LSL.  
Previous accounting studies have evaluated the effects of more or less prescriptive 
standards on auditor judgments. These studies, however, tend to focus on whether the type of 
standard can affect whether auditors constrain management aggressiveness in their financial 
reporting, whereas my study evaluates how different ways of thinking can result in auditor 
decisions more in line with the intentions of the respective standard. Interestingly, previous 
research finds mixed results in that sometimes more prescriptive standards lead to auditors’ 
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constraining management aggressiveness and sometimes more judgment-based standards lead 
to auditors’ constraining management aggressiveness. Additional research in this area either 
assumes or evaluates whether auditor decisions under more or less prescriptive standards are 
actually the result of auditor incentives, not the type of standard. Nelson (2003), in a review of 
accounting experiments on the effects of principles- versus rules-based standards, reports 
evidence from various studies suggesting that auditors are likely to allow aggressive reporting 
when their incentives align with such decisions; they do so not only when faced with client loss 
(Farmer et al. 1987), but also when there is lower litigation risk (e.g., Farmer, Rittenberg, & 
Trompeter 1987; Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996) and greater potential reputation loss 
(Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996). The more appropriate choice in these cases would have been 
greater conservatism, yet the auditors allowed greater aggressiveness, supported by objective 
accounting or auditing rules.  
The above studies are in contrast to other accounting literature which suggests that more 
prescriptive rules and standards can actually constrain aggressiveness (increase conservatism). 
For example, Ng & Tan (2003) reported experiment-based evidence that audit managers 
constrain aggressive reporting when prescriptive accounting standards support that less 
aggressive judgment, and allow more aggressive reporting when “there is no authoritative 
guidance indicating which of the two methods is the more appropriate method under GAAP”. 
Trompeter (1994) reported experiment-based evidence that audit partners working under a 
prescriptive accounting standard (marketable securities must be valued at the lower of cost or 
market) were less likely to allow aggressive reporting, as required by the standard. Under a less 
prescriptive standard (the most likely amount of a contingent loss should be recorded, but if the 
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actual amount of the loss cannot be reasonably estimated, then the lowest amount in the range 
should be recorded), audit partners made more aggressive decisions. 
Also interesting, a vast majority of research in this area assumes that the less aggressive 
judgment is the more correct response. There is limited accounting research which evaluates 
auditors’ decisions to allow or constrain aggressive financial statements when the most 
appropriate response is to allow the more aggressive option. In fact, academics typically make 
the assumption that constraining aggressive management reporting is among the most 
important responsibilities of auditors (e.g., Nelson 2003, 2009). A notable exception is a stream 
of research related to loss contingencies. Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (SFAS 5), loss contingencies, such as pending litigation, 
were required to be disclosed when the probability is “at least reasonably possible” that a 
material loss may be incurred (FASB 1975). If management is unable to reasonably estimate 
the contingency, the loss need not be accrued. Non-accrual based on ambiguity of information 
is arguably a non-conservative, but correct, decision. In one example of literature that evaluates 
auditor decisions in this environment, Nelson & Kinney (1997) find experimental evidence 
that, with ambiguous information (low confidence in the accuracy of the probability of loss), 
auditors are less likely to allow aggressive reporting when the client has low probability of loss 
in a law suit, but more likely to allow aggressive reporting when the client has a high 
probability of loss. Under the circumstances in this case, the low end of the range was arguably 
the most appropriate (and most aggressive) response. This study manipulated management’s 
level of confidence in the amount of the estimated potential loss and measured whether audit 
partners chose to disclose the loss, an indirect measure of how material the loss seems to the 
auditor. Like other studies in this area, however, the authors suggest that auditors act in a way 
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to avoid jeopardizing client relations, they do not evaluate the effect of auditor cognitive 
characteristics, as I do in my study.  
Research related to the principles- versus rules-based nature of IFRS offers additional, 
though limited, insight into auditor decisions in situations where standards are purportedly 
judgment-based, at least relative to U.S. GAAP, and where the most correct answer may be the 
more aggressive one. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva, & Wright (2013), for example, find 
that auditors are more likely to enforce conservative accounting under a more principles-based 
lease accounting standard. Under IFRS principles-based standards, the most appropriate 
decision is arguably less clear, suggesting that auditors feel more accountable for the audit and 
their professional judgment process and, therefore, constrain aggressive reporting. I suggest 
that the common theme in most of the above studies is not simply auditor incentive, but a 
cognitive limitation such that auditors rely heavily on cues, lists of rules, and perceived rules, 
rather than fully considering available facts and circumstances, when making important audit 
decisions, particularly in complex accounting situations. This prescriptive application of 
guidelines, rules, and perceived rules has also had very real implications to business and 
investors, as evidenced by the real-life cases discussed initially. 
Audit regulators publically criticize auditors for this check-the-box adherence to 
auditing standards (e.g., Pitt 2002; SEC 2005; Taub 2006) and have tended toward issuing 
standards that suggest general guidelines instead of specific bright-lines, intended to reduce this 
type of approach. For example, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB 2007a) was issued 
in 2007 to supersede Auditing Standard No. 2, which was criticized as having been 
implemented with a check-the-box mentality. The new standard explicitly emphasized the “top-
down approach” to determining internal controls for testing and replaced “strong indicators” of 
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material weakness with “indicators”, in an explicit attempt to limit the use of indicators as a 
checklist. Similarly, in 1999, the SEC recognized that auditors were applying quantitative 
“rules of thumb” in their setting of audit materiality, but were not properly considering 
qualitative factors. Standards in place prior to 1999 implied that auditors should consider 
qualitative factors in setting materiality, but in that year, the SEC issued a bulletin with a list of 
factors (guidelines) to consider in determining if a quantitatively small error might be 
considered qualitatively material (SEC 1999). That list has since been expanded and codified in 
PCAOB Auditing Standard 14 (PCAOB 2010d). 
Interestingly, there is a perception that auditing standards have moved in the opposite 
direction, toward increased comparability and less judgment, actually increasing the check-the-
box mentality related to audits of complex accounting (e.g., Burns & Fogarty 2010; Vakkur, 
McAfee, & Kipperman 2010). This likely follows from the perception that auditors adjust their 
judgment processes, or their conclusions, to align with what they perceive the regulator’s 
inspection teams expect, as opposed to what the standard-writers state explicitly (e.g., 
Wedemeyer 2010; Peecher, Solomon, & Trotman 2013). Given the PCAOB’s deficiency-based 
approach to auditor inspection (i.e., no rewards system exists, rather only “deficiencies” are 
reported), this suggests that the current regulatory structure is unlikely to motivate auditors to 
use professional judgment that strays far from perceived, sometimes unwritten, requirements. 
Additionally, this somewhat counter-intuitive result is consistent with the views of academics 
in accounting. A truly principles- or judgment-based standard allows financial statement 
preparers and auditors to determine the most appropriate value based on facts and 
circumstances. The addition of examples, suggestions, and other guidance may serve to cause 
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an even greater perception of prescription (Nelson 2003). Similarly, Schipper (2003), in her 
commentary on principles-based accounting standards, asks: 
Having provided a principle that clearly states the intent of the standard, how much 
additional explanation should be provided? How many terms should be defined, and at 
what level of detail? How much prescriptive explanation about how to apply the 
standard, such as numerical examples, should be included? My intent is to illustrate the 
ways in which a standard that is clearly grounded in a recognizable principle can 
become detailed and complex, with numerous rules, so that it appears to be rules-based 
and not principles-based. 
In my study, like Nelson (2003) and Schipper (2003), I view the prescriptiveness of 
standards on a continuum. At one end of the continuum are judgment-based accounting and 
audit standards (consistent with principles-based accounting standards like those promulgated 
by IFRS), and at the other end of the continuum are prescriptive (authoritative) standards with 
no room for interpretation. Between these two ends of the continuum exist standards which 
offer preparers and auditors detailed definitions, explanations, examples, etc. which, while 
intended as guidance to help determine the most appropriate accounting treatment, are likely to 
be treated prescriptively. 
I evaluate prescriptive versus judgment-based standards in a unique way by introducing 
a hypothetical judgment-based audit standard requiring auditors to use increased judgment that 
has the potential to result in a less conservative, but still (and arguably more) correct, audit 
decision (i.e., judgment leads to lower likelihood of a material misstatement and lower 
likelihood of a material weakness in ICFR). One reason I chose this particular manipulation is 
that this hypothetical change to standards is in line with the PCAOB’s and the accounting 
profession’s current push to increase auditor judgment (e.g., Treasury 2008). It allows auditors 
to use judgment in making their materiality decisions, without adding a series of additional 
suggestions or rules. While the U.S. authorities have placed an indefinite hold on the migration 
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to IFRS, the question of whether rules-based (i.e., prescriptive) or principles-based (i.e., 
judgment-based) standards are more appropriate continues. My choice in manipulation was also 
designed to be a stark contrast to the type of standard auditors are likely to be familiar with. It 
specifically suggests that the less conservative decision (calling a quantitatively material 
misstatement immaterial) might be the more correct decision, and allows two very different 
responses to the same information, depending only upon the ability to use judgment. This 
differentiates my study from previous work in that, under one condition (judgment-based 
standard), a more aggressive decision suggests greater use of professional judgment and, under 
the other condition (prescriptive standard), a less aggressive decision suggests greater use of 
professional judgment. Thus, my study evaluates the use of professional judgment to comply 
with the spirit of audit standards, based on thinking perspective and prescriptiveness of audit 
standards, as opposed to whether prescriptiveness simply leads to more or less aggressive 
decisions. 
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Chapter 3. Background – Systems-Thinking and Reductionist-Thinking 
Perspectives 
Asking auditors to use more judgment does not necessarily increase the chance that they 
will use more judgment. This limited use of judgment is at least partially due to human 
cognitive limitations that prevent auditors from incorporating complex information and 
processes into their understanding of cause-and-effect (e.g., Weiner 1985; Wood 1986; Rouse 
2007; Knauff & Wolfe 2010; Brewster 2011). I evaluate whether inducing elements of systems-
thinking, which has been shown in previous research to increase individuals’ ability to 
understand and appreciate dynamic complexity, will moderate auditors’ reactions to different 
levels of audit standard prescription.  
Separate but related fields of research in business organization and engineering have 
attempted to understand and explain complexity of processes in our world. Complex systems, 
whether manufacturing or accounting, may contain, among other elements, feedback 
mechanisms, nonlinear relations, irreversible processes, and time delays (Sterman 2000). 
Ultimately, problems are best solved, not by simply breaking them down into component parts, 
but by considering all implications and relations between parts. The ability to understand the 
whole, not just individual parts of a pattern is an important element of systems-thinking (Senge 
1990, pg. 6; Frank 2000). Individuals who take a systems-thinking perspective are likely able to 
understand how various parts of a process work together to produce an outcome, and to better 
understand true cause-and-effect relationships. This thinking perspective is contrasted with the 
reductionist approach, a linear process by which problems are broken into their component 
parts and analyzed separately (e.g., Senge 1990; O’Connor & McDermott 1997; Brewster 
2011). 
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The ability to take a systems-thinking perspective has been shown to be both learned 
and innate (Sterman 2000; Sweeney & Sterman 2000; Toshima 1993; Rouse 1986). The 
primary mechanisms that enable systems-thinking development include experiential learning, 
specific individual characteristics, and a supporting environment. Barriers to the development 
of systems-thinking include schedule and cost constraints and organizational boundaries or 
structure (Davidz, Nightingale, & Rhodes 2008). My study focuses on learned systems-thinking 
perspectives, leaving an evaluation of innate systems-thinking in accounting and auditing for 
future research. 
Implementing Systems-Thinking Skills 
Because the ideas behind systems-thinking have been studied across disciplines and 
over time, several frameworks have been developed to describe, teach, or implement systems-
thinking in the organization. For example, Richmond (1993) described the following seven 
“critical skills of systems-thinking”: 
(1) Dynamic thinking – see and deduce behavior patterns rather than focusing on  
events; phenomena result from ongoing circular processes unfolding through time 
rather than from a set of factors; the causal loop is the critical tool at this skill-level. 
(2) Closed-loop thinking – understand that the problem or question at hand is a set of 
interdependent processes rather than a “laundry list of one-way relations between a 
group of factors and a phenomenon that these factors are causing” (pg. 124). 
(3) Generic thinking – look beyond specific factors and understand that more general, 
or generic factors are at play; though it may appear on the surface that a specific 
factor or input is the cause of an outcome, it is possible that another, less specific or 
visible factor is actually the cause of both. 
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(4) Structural thinking – replace intuitive understanding of processes by a more factual, 
disciplined understanding; interactions between stocks and flows are emphasized at 
this skill level and units of measure become important; for example, an increase of 
inventory stock is measured on a unit basis, but an increase in inventory account 
balance stock is measured on a monetary basis; intuitively, both are an increase to 
inventory, but structurally, they must be separate. 
(5) Operational thinking – understand the relations between different processes and 
systems; indirect causal links between processes and systems become more 
important; at this skill level, individuals have a mental model of how processes 
really work, not conceptually or theoretically, but at the level of specific activities, 
information flow, etc. 
(6) Continuum thinking – create models using continuous (as opposed to discrete) flows 
of information, such that the stock is not simply increasing or decreasing but, rather 
increasing or decreasing by a certain amount or at a certain rate over time. 
(7) Scientific thinking – compare things that cannot be unambiguously measured; for 
example, height and width can be unambiguously measured, but how likable a 
person is cannot; in the audit context, the actual riskiness of a financial statement 
account balance cannot be unambiguously measured. 
According to Richmond (1993), all of these skills should be developed simultaneously in order 
to learn to be a systems-thinker. This framework describes systems-thinking elements at an 
operational level – skills that can be explicitly learned and implemented. My study uses 
elements of the first six systems-thinking skills (their operationalization is described below in 
the Method section), without concentrating on the individual effects of any single skill. This 
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allows me to look at the effects of a general, overall systems-thinking perspective on auditor 
judgments. The seventh skill is not explicitly introduced as a component of systems-thinking in 
the study, but this type of thinking is arguably an integral part of the audit process since 
auditors are regularly required to evaluate various types of audit risk, using ambiguous scales 
and measures. 
Conceptualizing Systems-Thinking Competencies 
Valerdi & Rouse (2010) developed a more recent summary of seven competencies 
generally present in systems-thinkers, based on a review of systems-thinking concepts and 
research. Their competencies are defined and described at a more conceptual level than are 
previous frameworks. Note that these are not implementable skills, per se. Rather, as 
operational systems-thinking skills are acquired, these competencies become apparent in the 
individual. According to this framework, systems-thinkers have each of the following 
competencies: 
(1) Define the “universe” appropriately: understanding how local actions impact global 
outcomes. 
(2) Define the overall system appropriately: view problems as components of an overall 
system rather than surface outcomes or events. 
(3) See relationships: component parts of a system can best be understood in relation 
with each other and with other systems. 
(4) See things holistically: the relationships within the universe work together to tell the 
whole story. 
(5) Understand complexity: systems contain linkages and interactions, events are 
separated by distance and time, and small events can be the cause of large effects. 
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(6) Communicate across disciplines: convey information within an organization through 
an understanding of multiple perspectives. 
(7) Take advantage of a broad range of concepts, principles, models, methods, and 
tools: problems and decisions can be understood at technical, human, or conceptual 
levels. 
In my study, I use the framework developed by Valerdi & Rouse (2010) to formulate 
and evaluate the systems-thinking perspective at the conceptual level. I focus on two high level 
systems-thinking concepts derived from this study: understanding causal attribution, the ability 
to understand both detail and dynamic complexity to identify cause-and-effect (derived 
primarily from the fifth competency); and holistic thinking, the ability to see things holistically 
within and among relationships, systems, and processes (derived primarily from the fourth 
competency). Again, there is not a direct linkage between the individual competencies in the 
conceptual Valerdi & Rouse (2010) framework and the skills in the operational Richmond 
(1993) framework (or other operational frameworks). Instead, by learning and applying the 
skills, an individual can achieve the overall competencies. In the following sections, I describe 
how elements of the operational skills map into these two systems-thinking concepts. 
Understanding Causal Attribution in Complex Situations 
Systems-thinking allows individuals to make better informed decisions by, in part, 
allowing them to more fully understand cause-and-effect in dynamically complex situations 
(e.g., Senge 1990; Frank 2000). This best aligns conceptually with the fifth competency above, 
ability to understand complexity. Specifically, this speaks to systems-thinkers’ ability to 
understand both detail and dynamic complexity within a process and how interdependencies 
between elements of a process reflect non-linear cause-and-effect relationships.  
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The Valerdi & Rouse (2010) competencies are interrelated. For example, the ability to 
define the overall system appropriately (the second competency above) clearly has implications 
for systems-thinkers’ better causal attribution; they understand how problematic outcomes 
(e.g., potential financial misstatements) are part of an overall system of processes and events 
(Valerdi & Rouse 2010). This means, for example, that obvious (surface) events may not be the 
actual, or primary cause of an outcome. Systems-thinkers are able to look more deeply at a 
problem or question because they know the system is not necessarily as simple as it appears. 
Therefore, while I specifically study causal attribution in systems- versus reductionist-thinkers, 
I also indirectly study their differential abilities to understand or define the boundaries of the 
processes they are auditing. 
It is not difficult to see how various operational systems-thinking skills, from the 
Richmond (1993) framework, contribute to these abilities. Systems-thinkers are able to see and 
deduce behavior patterns rather than focusing on, and seeking to predict, events. Rather than 
assuming that one visible factor led to a specific outcome, as reductionist-thinkers might, 
systems-thinkers recognize that the outcome resulted from a factor or factors that occurred over 
a period of time (dynamic thinking). They recognize that every action, or cause, is not tied to 
one specific outcome, or effect. Rather, most actions can have multiple potential outcomes, and 
most outcomes can have multiple possible causes (closed-loop thinking). Reductionist-thinkers 
look for specific cause-and-effect relationships, but systems-thinkers recognize that an action 
that appears to be the cause of an outcome might actually be an outcome of a bigger cause 
(generic thinking). For example, from the context of auditing complex transactions, 
management may make a judgment about an input to a complex estimate (e.g., the number of 
units likely to be submitted for service under the company’s warranty agreement, as an input 
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into the warranty reserve financial account balance). If that judgment later proves to be 
incorrect, the reductionist-thinker is likely to consider management’s incorrect judgment to be 
the cause of the now misstated warranty reserve balance (outcome). Systems-thinkers, while 
they likely recognize management’s judgment as one cause of the outcome, also likely 
recognize that the complexity of the judgment process is another cause of the outcome. Of 
course, the structural thinking and operational thinking skills that cause systems-thinkers to 
develop mental models with links from multiple related systems also allow them to better 
recognize the myriad potential causes of an outcome. Continuing the previous example, both 
reductionist- and systems-thinkers likely recognize that management’s decisions cause changes 
to the warranty reserve balance. Systems-thinkers, however, are more likely to recognize that 
less obvious factors, perhaps those outside of management’s control (e.g., labor disputes in an 
industry that provides services to a client’s supplier) can, or should, also affect the warranty 
reserve balance. 
I choose to focus on this particular concept, understanding causal attribution, in my 
study for practical reasons related to auditor reporting conclusions. First, public company audits 
typically involve an integrated audit of ICFR and financial statements (PCAOB 2007a), and 
internal control, according to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) is a process effected by people, their policies, and their actions (COSO 
2013). Practically speaking, an ICFR deficiency exists if management lacks the ability, or does 
not put forth appropriate effort to achieve a reasonable level of assurance that financial 
statements are accurate. It is therefore important that auditors recognize whether management’s 
effort and/or ability are likely causes of potential financial misstatements. Second, each of the 
subjective, interrelated, and potentially numerous inputs to a complex accounting estimate has 
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the potential to cause that estimate to be incorrect. Recognizing multiple potential causes of 
misstatements allows auditors to judge the reasonableness of audited estimates. 
In order to evaluate whether systems- and reductionist-thinkers treat cause-and-effect in 
complex accounting situations as predicted by system dynamics theory described above, I 
incorporate attribution theory into my analyses. Attribution theory relates to how individuals 
attempt to explain the cause of events or outcomes (e.g., Heider 1958; Kelley 1967), and 
“people explain outcomes in all unintentional events by references to causes (which can be 
located either in the person or the situation)” (Malle 2004, pg. 12).3 This is particularly true 
when there is uncertainty in the process leading to that outcome (Shields, Birnberg & Frieze 
1981). Estimation of financial statement accounts that require significant management 
judgment (e.g., warranty reserve estimates, financial derivatives, etc.) presents an example of 
such uncertain processes.  
According to Weiner (1985), an evaluator may attribute outcomes to a decision-maker’s 
ability or effort (internal attributions). Alternately, an evaluator may attribute outcomes to 
something external to the decision-maker, like the decision-maker’s bad luck or the complexity 
of the task at hand (external attributions). Research in social psychology finds evidence of 
certain biases in causal attribution. Specifically, such research finds evidence that when an 
individual (“evaluator”) is asked to evaluate a decision-maker in the presence of a negative 
outcome, he or she is likely to attribute the cause of the negative outcome to the decision-
maker’s internal factors, without necessarily considering the potential causality of external 
factors (Jones & Nisbett 1971; Ajzen, & Fishbein 1975, Malle 2004, 2006). When, for 
                                                          
3
 Attribution research also investigates the reasons behind individuals’ decisions, or intentional events. By holding 
constant that the outcome is unintentional, however, my study examines causal attribution without addressing 
reason attribution. 
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example, an auditor learns that a complex accounting estimate that was previously audited will 
likely have an ultimate value that differs from the audited value, individual auditors generally 
attribute the potential negative impact on financial statements to internal management factors 
without necessarily, or adequately, considering external factors. Given the systems-thinkers’ 
increased ability to recognize and appreciate dynamic complexity, though, they are more likely 
to recognize a more comprehensive range of probable causes than are reductionist-thinkers. 
This allows them to attribute their conclusions to factors external to company management 
when those external factors exist and/or are likely relevant and diagnostic (e.g., Jones & Nisbett 
1971; Ajzen & Fishbein 1975; Malle 2004, 2006). Specifically, systems-thinkers are more 
likely to recognize that the dynamic complexity of the process is a significant causal factor, 
relative to management’s effort or ability, in the ultimate realization of an estimated financial 
statement account. 
Holistic Thinking 
In addition to understanding the many possible causes of potential financial 
misstatements, auditors must consider the complex estimates, and the procedures used to 
develop them, in relation to the overall audit process. They must relate the complexities of the 
business and accounts they are auditing to their overall assessment of audit-related risk 
(PCAOB 2010a), as well as to their ultimate audit conclusions (PCAOB 2010c). This primarily 
aligns conceptually with the fourth systems-thinking competency above, ability to see things 
holistically (to tell the whole story). Systems-thinkers study the whole to understand the parts, 
whereas reductionist-thinkers focus on the parts, or detail complexity (O’Connor & McDermott 
1997).  
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As with the causal attribution concept described above, the holistic thinking 
competency is also achieved by implementing operational systems-thinking skills, like those 
from the Richmond (1993) framework. Systems-thinkers’ ability to understand and integrate 
patterns into their thought processes, as in dynamic and closed-loop thinking, are of course 
important first steps in building complex mental models. The ability to think holistically also 
comes from the ability to see the big picture (generic thinking). Structural thinking and 
operational thinking skills integrate various systems and processes into an overall global 
process, assuming it is appropriate to do so.  
I choose to focus on holistic thinking in my study for practical reasons related to auditor 
planning and audit procedure decisions. Decades of research suggests that individuals are 
overconfident in their evaluations of potential outcomes, especially in complex situations. They 
overestimate the likelihood that future outcomes will be similar to past outcomes and 
underestimate the likelihood that more extreme outcomes will be realized (e.g., Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff, & Phillips 1982; Sterman 2000; Taleb 2007). Because of their focus on the overall 
systemic structure and complex patterns however, systems-thinkers are likely to see how 
changes in one or more factors of a complex process are likely to affect outcomes, possibly in 
unexpected ways (Sterman 2000). They recognize that extreme outcomes are likely, and they 
also recognize how outcomes in one process or system affect decisions in related processes or 
systems. This integration of multiple systems allows systems-thinking auditors to understand 
how the complex process related to the estimate they are auditing is to be integrated into the 
recursive risk evaluation process in a financial statement audit (e.g., Bell et al. 2005).  
In my study, I do not directly evaluate the existence of the first and third competencies, 
the ability to define the “universe” appropriately and the ability to see relationships, in 
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participants. Both of these competencies reflect the systems-thinkers’ abilities to see the big 
picture and, as such, are likely related to holistic thinking. However, both of these 
competencies are defined at a higher level than is in scope for this study. Specifically, the 
“universe” of an audit might be thought of as reliability of the financial statements as a whole 
(PCAOB 2002), or responsibility toward users of financial statements. While these are 
important concepts, I choose to focus on decisions at an account and business process level for 
tractability.  Additionally, I do not include the final two competencies, ability to communicate 
across disciplines and ability to take advantage of a broad range of concepts, principles, 
models, methods, and tools. Systems-thinking is a concept contemplated to improve the way 
organizations operate and these two competencies, while likely important to audit firm and 
team organization and operations, are outside the scope of audit decisions that I evaluate in this 
study. 
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Chapter 4. Hypothesis Development 
In this chapter, I develop the study’s hypotheses, predicting a joint effect of audit 
standard prescriptiveness and auditors’ thinking perspective on auditors’ check-the-box 
decisions in the audit of complex estimates. Judgment-based standards are intended to decrease 
check-the-box decisions identified under prescriptive standards and increase auditors’ use of 
professional judgment. Theory suggests, however, that these judgment-based (versus 
prescriptive) audit standards also increase the detail and dynamic complexity of auditors’ 
decision processes when auditing complex accounting estimates. That increase in complexity 
displaces professional judgment, resulting in check-the-box decisions under these judgment-
based standards as well. Next, I introduce a systems-thinking intervention which previously 
described theory predicts moderates the effect of standard type by affecting auditors’ 
understanding of process complexity and their incorporation of process complexity into the 
audit. The theory used in this study predicts a difference in auditor decisions based on an 
interaction between standard-type and thinking perspective (at the conceptual level), and my 
contextually rich experiment, which manipulates the existing audit materiality standard, 
PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 11 (PCAOB 2010b), allows more specific predictions under 
each experimental condition (at an operational level). 
Hypothesis Development at the Conceptual Level 
Recall that judgment-based standards are issued with the intention that auditors will 
consider subjective evidence gathered during their procedures and, when appropriate, alter their 
audit decisions based on that evidence. As such, it is likely that auditors with both systems- and 
reductionist-thinking perspectives will make decisions under both prescriptive and judgment-
based standards that are consistent with the respective standard. An important distinction is that 
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theory and prior research both suggest that, when auditing complex accounting estimates, 
reductionist-thinking auditors will prescriptively adhere to standards, whether they are written 
as authoritative series of rules, lists of suggestions for consideration or, as in my study, a 
requirement to consider that some quantitatively small errors in estimates can be material 
because of qualitative factors and some quantitatively large errors in estimates can be 
considered not material because of qualitative factors. Systems-thinkers, on the other hand, will 
dig deeper to appreciate and adhere to the substance of the standard. Using a check-the-box 
approach, reductionist-thinkers will make different decisions under prescriptive and judgment-
based standards if the standards suggest that their judgment might be different. For example, 
the mere suggestion that a quantitatively material misstatement may not necessarily be material 
to financial statement users should be enough to reduce the likelihood of a material 
misstatement judgment for an auditor with a check-the-box mentality. Systems-thinkers, on the 
other hand, will make different decisions under prescriptive and judgment-based standards 
because they are better able to incorporate the complexity of the accounting estimation process 
under both standard types and, under the judgment-based standard, they are also better able to 
recognize that the standard allows them to consider all available information and make 
informed, judgment-based decisions, based on the substance of the standard and its impact on 
the overall audit. As such, I make a preliminary hypothesis, at the conceptual level, as follows: 
Conceptual Hypothesis: Auditors will make different audit-related decisions under 
prescriptive audit standards than under judgment-based standards, consistent with the 
guidance in the respective standard, and this difference will be more pronounced for 
auditors with a systems-thinking perspective than those with a reductionist-thinking 
perspective. 
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Operational Level Hypotheses 
Prior research in auditing suggests that context- and task-specific knowledge are 
important in developing expectations for professional auditors’ behavior when studying audit-
related decisions (e.g., Brown & Solomon 1990, 1991). In the earlier of these two studies, for 
example, Brown & Solomon (1990) made different predictions of auditor misstatement risk 
decisions depending upon whether internal controls were compensatory or supplemental. Both 
predictions, however, showed theory-based evidence at the conceptual level, that auditors 
effectively execute configural processing. In a similar way, in my study, the effect of the 
difference in auditor decisions between prescriptive and judgment-based audit standards 
necessarily depends upon the standard itself.  
For example, a judgment-based standard might suggest to the auditor that a situation is 
more likely to result in a material misstatement (or a material weakness in ICFR, existence of 
fraud, etc.). In this case, both systems- and reductionist-thinkers are predicted to have higher 
material misstatement decisions under judgment-based than under prescriptive standards. 
Alternately, a judgment-based standard might suggest to the auditor that a situation is less 
likely to result in a material misstatement (or a material weakness in ICFR, existence of fraud, 
etc.). In this case, both systems- and reductionist-thinkers would be predicted to have lower 
material misstatement decisions under judgment-based than prescriptive standards. My study 
uses a hypothetical audit standard consistent with the latter, allowing directional predictions 
and thus a stronger test of my theory. Specifically, the substance of the prescriptive standard is 
that a quantitatively material misstatement must always be considered material; a check-the-
box approach under this standard results in a material misstatement decision, but a deeper 
evaluation of the facts of the case, as likely performed by a systems-thinker, should lead to the 
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identification of numerous potential causes of a potential material misstatement and an even 
higher likelihood of concluding as such. The substance of the judgment-based standard is that a 
misstatement is material only if it affects the decisions of a financial statement user; a check-
the-box approach under this standard is simply a lower likelihood of material misstatement than 
under the prescriptive standard condition, but a deeper evaluation should lead to the recognition 
of various factors within the case suggesting that financial statement users may not be affected 
by the potential misstatement and an even lower likelihood of concluding a material 
misstatement exists. My study evaluated decisions related to the two primary conclusions in 
most public company audits, existence of a material misstatement and existence of a material 
weakness in ICFR. 
Specifically, the existing materiality standard, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 11, 
prescribes that “the materiality level for the financial statements as a whole needs to be 
expressed as a specified amount” (PCAOB 2010b). This standard allows auditors to 
judgmentally conclude that misstatements smaller than quantitative materiality may be 
considered qualitatively material because they may have an impact on investors’ decisions – 
uni-directional qualitative materiality. The 2008 Pozen Committee, however, suggested that, 
under certain circumstances, qualitative considerations might be used to evaluate a 
misstatement greater than quantitative materiality as not material to investors (the Pozen 
Committee 2008). For example, consider an estimate whose estimation uncertainty range is 
many times quantitative materiality. In such a situation, the auditor cannot reasonably expect 
the estimate to be correct within quantitative materiality, and any new estimate is unlikely to be 
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any better an estimate.
4
 Christensen et al. (2012) suggest that, when the estimation uncertainty 
range of a financial statement account balance is many times traditional auditor materiality, the 
auditor is not technically able to conclude that the reported estimate is fairly stated in all 
quantitatively material respects. Further, it should not be surprising to discover that a 
previously audited account balance with such a high degree of estimation uncertainty actually 
turns out to be quantitatively materially different from the audited amount. The tone of the 
Pozen Committee (2008) report and Christensen at al. (2012) seems to be that financial 
statement users understand that extreme uncertainty exists within complex estimates, but audit 
standards have not changed to allow more judgmental interpretations of what might have a 
material effect on users. 
Primary Hypothesis – Check-the-Box Material Misstatement 
The hypothetical materiality standard that I developed for this study follows in the tone 
of the Pozen Committee suggestion and of the research described above, asking the auditor to 
use professional judgment in determining whether a quantitatively material difference is also 
qualitatively material. The case study used in the experiment suggests that there exists a 
quantitatively material difference between management’s recorded estimate and the most likely 
future realized value. In this circumstance, the prescriptive audit standard requires a conclusion 
of material misstatement, whereas the judgment-based standard allows the auditor to consider 
qualitative factors in determining whether the potential misstatement is material to the financial 
                                                          
4
 Christensen et al. (2012) document that General Motors’ 2002 pension obligation had an estimation uncertainty 
range of well over 50 times quantitative materiality. A very small, and reasonable, adjustment to one of the several 
inputs to the estimate could have a substantial effect on the pension obligation balance. The auditor is tasked with 
deciding whether the input used is reasonable, even though the ultimate outcome is likely to be very different from 
the recorded estimate. Similar situations existed related to Wells Fargo’s 2003-2008 mortgage backed securities 
estimate (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012) and Microsoft’s 2006 Xbox warranty reserve estimate (e.g., Peecher, 
Solomon, & Trotman 2013).  
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statement users. Importantly, the hypothetical standard simply allows the auditors to use 
judgment in making their materiality decision such that a quantitatively material misstatement 
need not be considered material to financial statement users, and does not add a series of 
additional suggestions or rules. This is consistent with suggestions from the audit profession 
(e.g., Treasury 2008) and academic literature extolling the introduction of auditor judgment 
rules, under which auditors who make “judgments that are within their authority and for which 
there is a rational basis generally cannot have their judgments second-guessed by the courts or 
be held responsible for subsequent third-party losses” (Peecher et al. 2013, pg. 605; see also 
Backof, Bamber, & Carpenter 2013). Further, the case study describes factors, similar to those 
described by Christensen et al. (2012), which suggest that the difference may not be material to 
users.  Under the prescriptive standard, the potential misstatement more closely fits the 
definition of material misstatement while, under the judgment-based standard, the potential 
misstatement less closely fits the definition. As such, irrespective of thinking perspective, I 
predict that participants in the prescriptive standard condition are more likely to conclude that a 
material misstatement exists than are participants in the judgment-based standard condition.  
However, I predict that the difference between material misstatement decisions under 
different standard-types will be moderated by auditors’ thinking perspectives. See a graphical 
depiction of Hypothesis 1 at Figure 1. Systems- (versus reductionist-) thinking auditors better 
understand the role that process complexity plays relative to other factors in the audit 
environment. For example, as described earlier and tested as Hypotheses 2a and 2b, systems-
thinkers are less likely than reductionist-thinkers to be affected by certain biases related to 
causal attribution. They better understand the role of process complexity, relative to the role of 
management’s actions and abilities, in determining the ultimate outcome of a complex 
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accounting estimate. Similarly, systems-thinkers apply holistic thinking, better relating the 
process of developing or recalculating a complex estimate to the overall audit process. Because 
of this better understanding, systems-thinkers better grasp that the potential misstatement is not 
an isolated event, but a symptom of process-complexity, that there are many other ways that a 
misstatement might occur, and that the potential misstatement can be exceedingly 
quantitatively large. As a result, under a prescriptive audit standard emphasizing quantitative 
materiality, systems-thinkers will judge the likelihood of material misstatement to be even 
greater than will reductionist-thinkers. At the same time, while systems-thinkers better 
understand the ways a misstatement might occur irrespective of the standard-type, under a 
judgment-based standard, they are also likely to more fully consider the many qualitative 
factors suggesting that a quantitatively large misstatement is not material to financial statement 
users. As a result of this additional consideration, systems-thinkers under judgment-based 
standards will have lower material misstatement decisions than reductionist-thinkers.  
In Figure 1, the steeper slope of the solid line, as compared with that of the dotted line, 
indicates the greater impact of audit standard prescription for systems-thinkers than for 
reductionist-thinkers. I predict that auditor material misstatement decisions will be highest for 
systems-thinkers under prescriptive materiality standards, lower for reductionist-thinkers under 
prescriptive materiality standards, still lower for reductionist-thinkers under judgment-based 
materiality standards, and lowest of all conditions for systems-thinkers under judgment-based 
materiality standards. This pattern of auditor decisions is summarized in my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Auditors are more likely to decide that the potential misstatement is a 
material misstatement under prescriptive audit standards than under judgment-based 
standards, and this difference will be more pronounced for auditors with a systems-
thinking perspective than those with a reductionist-thinking perspective. 
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Process Measure Hypotheses – Material Misstatement 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are related to the processes through which systems-thinking 
moderates the effects of the different types of audit standards. As discussed above, systems-
thinkers’ deeper understanding and better incorporation of complexity into their audit 
judgments (as tested in H1) allow for more pronounced judgments in both the prescriptive and 
judgment-based standard conditions. This difference in judgments is facilitated by systems-
thinkers’ better causal attribution and holistic thinking. 
I first evaluate the relation between auditors’ internal and external attributions, or locus 
of causality, as described in Weiner (1985), for auditors with reductionist- vs. systems-thinking 
perspectives. Attribution theory suggests that individuals are naturally biased toward ascribing 
causality for negative events to another person, without necessarily considering the complexity 
of the process as a potential cause. In this study, this suggests a natural tendency to attribute 
management’s effort and/or ability as the cause of a potential financial misstatement. Systems-
thinkers, however, better recognize that the complex accounting process described in the case 
study is also likely to be a cause of the misstatement. Relative to their causal attributions to 
factors associated with management (effort and ability), participants will ascribe some level of 
causality to the complexity of the process described in the case study. System dynamics theory 
predicts that systems-thinkers will attribute a greater level of this causality to the complexity of 
the process. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Relative to their causal attributions to management effort and ability, 
systems-thinkers are more likely than reductionist-thinkers to attribute causality for a 
potential misstatement to the complexity of the accounting process. 
 
Next, I evaluate the effect of thinking perspective on auditors’ holistic thinking. The 
audited process (e.g., warranty reserves) and the auditing process are linked in an audit setting 
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via the standard audit risk model (PCAOB 2010a); more specifically, via the inherent risk 
component of that model. Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an assertion to a misstatement, 
due to error or fraud that could be material, before consideration of any related controls.
5
 Recall 
that, in my study, participants attribute a proportion of the potential financial misstatement’s 
cause to process complexity; they also attribute audit results to the three components of the 
audit risk model: control risk (described as internal control effectiveness), inherent risk, and 
detection risk. Process complexity is, according to PCAOB Auditing Standard 12, a factor in 
evaluating the inherent risk of material misstatement (PCAOB 2010c), so attributions to 
complexity and inherent risk should, in accordance with audit processes, be highly correlated. 
System dynamics theory suggests that systems-thinkers are better able to recognize associations 
across processes. I therefore predict a closer correlation between systems-thinkers’ causal 
attributions to business process complexity and inherent risk judgments than between those of 
reductionist-thinkers. My next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2b: Auditors’ evaluations of accounting estimate process complexity will be 
more closely correlated with their evaluations of inherent risk for systems-thinkers than 
for reductionist-thinkers. 
Secondary Hypothesis – Check-the-Box Material Weakness in ICFR 
As described earlier, the check-the-box auditing mentality likely causes auditors to 
perceive those regulations that contain lists of definitions, examples, etc. as a form of checklist, 
to be explicitly used in making audit decisions. Recall that, along a continuum of judgment-
based to authoritatively prescriptive standards, those that offer such a series of definitions, 
examples, etc. fall somewhere in the middle. One such standard is Audit Standard No. 5, An 
                                                          
5
 PCAOB Audit Standard 8 (PCAOB 2010a) defines three elements of the standard audit risk model: (1) inherent 
risk; (2) control risk, the risk that a misstatement due to error or fraud, and that could be material will not be 
prevented or detected on a timely basis by the company's internal control; and (3) detection risk, the risk that the 
procedures performed by the auditor will not detect a misstatement that exists and that could be material. 
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Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial 
Statements (PCAOB 2007a). As a follow-up to the primary analysis of auditors’ check-the-box 
material misstatement decisions, I next analyze auditors’ resulting check-the-box material 
weakness decisions. 
The PCAOB, in its Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 11, writes that “evaluating whether a 
control deficiency … results in a material weakness requires professional skepticism and a 
careful analysis of all the evidence obtained. Auditors who perform a mechanical or cursory 
evaluation of deficiencies might reach premature conclusions without appropriately considering 
critical information. For example, a mechanical or cursory evaluation may lead an auditor to … 
focus on a checklist of material weakness indicators without considering other relevant factors” 
(PCAOB 2013, pg. 35). The “checklist of material weakness indicators” referenced by the 
regulator in Practice Alert 11 is the following list from PCAOB Auditing Standard 5 (PCAOB 
2007, pg. 44, paraphrased): 
 Identification of fraud on the part of senior management; 
 Restatement of previously issued financial statements; 
 Identification by the auditor of a material misstatement of financial statements in 
the current period in circumstances that indicate that the misstatement would not 
have been detected by the company's internal control over financial reporting; and 
 Ineffective oversight of the company's external financial reporting and internal 
control over financial reporting by the company's audit committee. 
A check-the-box mentality in interpreting this standard likely leads to both type I and type II 
errors in the identification of ICFR material weaknesses; (1) auditors conclude that material 
weaknesses in ICFR exist when they may not exist at all, because a mental checklist leads them 
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to that conclusion; (2) auditors are not identifying material weaknesses in ICFR that actually 
exist because the actual cause of the material weakness is something other than the items in the 
mental checklist. While identification of a material misstatement in the current period is listed 
as a potential indicator of material weakness, this does not mean that a material weakness 
necessarily exists when a material misstatement has occurred, only that this should be 
considered. Similarly, it is not necessary that a material misstatement occur in order to suggest 
that a material weakness in ICFR exists. 
My study relies on auditors’ knowledge of the above audit standard and does not 
explicitly describe any aspects of the standard. Rather, auditors’ material weakness decisions 
are measured to evaluate whether they respond as if following the standard in a check-the-box 
manner. For this portion of the analysis, I expect my manipulated audit standard to affect 
participants’ decisions insofar as it affects their material misstatement decisions. In the case 
study used in the experiment, I hold constant that the internal controls of the audited firm were 
tested by the audit team and found to be highly effective in both design and implementation. 
Since this reduces the likelihood that a material weakness in ICFR exists, I define a check-the-
box material weakness decision as an increase in the conclusion that an ICFR material 
weakness exists based on the existence of a material misstatement of the financial statements. 
In other words, the only evidence that a material weakness in ICFR may exist is the supposition 
that there is a material misstatement of the financial statements. 
Evidence of check-the-box decisions is likely to manifest in different ways for auditors 
under the differently prescriptive audit standards, based on predictions of material misstatement 
decisions. See a graphical depiction of Hypothesis 3 at Figure 2. Recall that systems-thinkers 
under the prescriptive standard are most likely of all conditions to conclude that a material 
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misstatement exists; systems-thinkers under the judgment-based standard are least likely of all 
conditions to conclude that a material misstatement exists. Despite this, I predict that across 
standard-type conditions, systems-thinkers are the least likely to conclude that a material 
weakness in ICFR exists. Under judgment-based standards, systems-thinkers are unlikely to 
conclude that an ICFR material weakness exists because they are least likely to conclude that a 
material misstatement exists and audit procedures suggest ICFR are working properly. Next, 
since ICFR are management’s policies and procedures, implemented to give them comfort that 
financial statements are accurate, systems-thinkers under the prescriptive standard are likely to 
recognize that inherent risk is the more likely cause of the material misstatement than are 
weaknesses in ICFR (again, given that ICFR are very well designed and implemented and 
inherent risk is high). As such, systems-thinkers are likely to less strongly link an ICFR 
material weakness to a material misstatement decision than are reductionist-thinkers (reflected 
in the dashed line in Figure 2 being higher than the solid line). 
Theory suggests that reductionist-thinkers are more likely to have a check-the-box 
reaction to guidance within AS No. 5, which suggests that weaknesses in ICFR are likely the 
cause of the potential material misstatement. Recall from H1 that reductionist-thinkers under 
the prescriptive standard are more likely to conclude that a material misstatement exists than 
are those under the judgment-based standard. As such, I predict that reductionist-thinkers under 
the prescriptive standard are more likely to conclude that an ICFR material weakness exists 
than are those under the judgment-based standard (reflected by the slope of the dashed line in 
Figure 2).  
I predict that auditor ICFR material weakness conclusions will be highest for 
reductionist-thinkers under the prescriptive materiality standard, lower for reductionist-thinkers 
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under the judgment-based materiality standard, and lowest for systems-thinkers across both 
materiality standards. This pattern of auditor decision is summarized in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Auditors are more likely to conclude that a material weakness in ICFR 
exists when they are reductionist-thinkers than when they are systems-thinkers, and 
reductionist-thinkers are more likely to conclude that a material weakness in ICFR 
exists under prescriptive audit standards than under judgment-based standards. 
Process Measure Hypotheses – ICFR Material Weakness 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b are related to the processes through which systems-thinking 
moderates the effects of material misstatement conclusions on ICFR material weakness 
conclusions. The theory is consistent with that presented for H2a and H2b, in that the different 
causal attributions applied by systems- and reductionist-thinkers, as previously described, and 
different incorporation of complexity into the overall audit process, facilitate the different 
decisions tested in H3. Therefore, I also begin with an evaluation of whether the relation 
between participants’ internal and external attributions, or locus of causality, as described in 
Weiner (1985), help to explain the different ICFR material weakness decisions of participants 
with reductionist- and systems-thinking perspectives.  
Consistent with my predictions related to material misstatement decisions, I predict that, 
relative to their causal attributions to factors associated with management (effort and ability), 
participants will ascribe some level of causality for their ICFR material weakness decisions to 
the complexity of the process described in the case study. However, given the prediction that 
systems-thinkers are less likely to conclude that an ICFR material weakness exists, it is less 
likely that they will consider process complexity to be the cause; rather I expect a greater 
attribution to management’s effort and ability, since these better represent management’s 
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(positive) ability to implement effective internal controls. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a: Relative to their causal attributions to management effort and ability, 
systems-thinkers are less likely than reductionist-thinkers to attribute causality for their 
ICFR material weakness decision to the complexity of the accounting process. 
 
There is tension in this prediction. The prediction is based on H3’s prediction that 
systems-thinkers are less likely to conclude that a material weakness exists, however my 
experiment only allows me to measure relative material weakness conclusions (not a discrete 
yes or no conclusion). Systems-thinkers may conclude that a material weakness in fact exists, 
but to a lesser degree than reductionist-thinkers. If this is the case, it is unlikely that they will 
attribute more causality to management effort and ability, relative to process complexity, since 
their effort and ability did not prevent the material weakness. If this occurs, it is possible that 
there will be no difference between systems- and reductionist-thinkers’ relative attributions, or 
that systems-thinkers will attribute more causality to complexity, as was predicted in H2a and 
H2b relative to material misstatement decisions. 
Like the correlation between causal attributions to business process complexity and 
inherent risk judgments predicted relative to material misstatement conclusions, I also predict a 
correlation between attributions to management effort and internal controls, as well as between 
management ability and internal controls. The control risk component of standard audit risk 
model (PCAOB 2010a) is the risk that management’s policies and procedures will not prevent 
or detect a material misstatement on a timely basis. Control risk is a function of the 
effectiveness of the design and operation of internal controls, which are effected by people and, 
therefore, a function of their ability and effort. I therefore predict a closer correlation between 
systems-thinkers’ causal attributions to management attributes and their judgments of internal 
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control effectiveness than between those of reductionist-thinkers. My final hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 4b: Auditors’ evaluations of management’s effort and ability related to 
ICFR conclusions will be more closely correlated with their evaluations of internal 
control effectiveness for systems-thinkers than for reductionist-thinkers. 
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Chapter 5. Method 
Experimental Design and Participants 
I employ a 2×2 between subjects ×2 within subjects (repeated measures) mixed 
experimental design to test my hypotheses. See Appendix A for a graphical depiction of the 
overall design. The manipulation of prescriptive vs. judgment-based audit standard occurs 
immediately after participants are introduced to a fictitious audit client, eduTECH. The induced 
systems- vs. reductionist-thinking perspective manipulation begins immediately afterward and 
is carried out via a set of instructions describing the development of audit-focused mental 
models.
6
 Shortly before responding to the first independent measure question, participants are 
reminded of the judgment-based vs. prescriptive audit standard manipulation.  
I operationalize judgment-based audit standards by introducing a hypothetical standard 
relaxing the current uni-directional rules for the consideration of both quantitative and 
qualitative factors when determining audit materiality. This operationalization is described in 
detail in the hypothesis development section. My hypothetical materiality standard allows the 
auditor to use professional judgment in determining whether a quantitatively material 
difference is also qualitatively material – a bi-directional qualitative materiality evaluation. 
The within subjects manipulation captures participants’ initial vs. final material 
misstatement decisions for H1,  H2a and H2b, and initial vs. final ICFR material weakness 
decisions for H3, H4a, and H4b. Participants’ initial decisions are based on a description of 
                                                          
6
 It is not guaranteed that induced systems-thinking will affect professional auditors’ decisions under the 
experimental conditions presented. To the extent participants have stronger innate systems- or reductionist-
thinking perspectives (e.g., Toshima 1993), their responses to the manipulation are likely to be weaker. Similarly, 
to the extent that professional auditors have received training, or have learned methodologies, based on one or the 
other of the perspectives, the effect of the manipulation may be weakened. Previous systems-thinking research in 
the audit context has used students as participants (e.g., Hecht 2004; Brewster 2011). These students have not been 
subjected to years of audit firm training, as have the participants in my study. This suggests that an effect based on 
the relatively simplistic systems-thinking cue used in this study is likely to be even stronger were it implemented 
to a greater, more consistent, extent in practice. 
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completed audit procedures. After receiving new information suggesting the previously audited 
warranty reserve estimate is likely incorrect, they make their final material misstatement and 
ICFR material weakness decisions. Figure 3 depicts the point estimate and estimation error 
ranges given to participants both before and after the new information. Note that the updated 
estimate of future warranty costs is $6 million greater than the original point estimate ($25 
million), representing a difference that is 3-times quantitative materiality ($2 million). The case 
study describes additional qualitative factors, similar to those described by Christensen et al. 
(2012), which suggest that the difference may not be material to users.  For example, the 
estimation error range around the point estimate is +/- 4-times quantitative materiality, 
eduTech’s process for developing the estimate is dynamically complex, and management has 
very good internal controls over financial reporting. These factors suggest that management’s 
recorded estimate is still likely to be reasonable, even given the new information suggesting a 
potentially large change to the estimate. The updated estimate is also within the original 
estimation error range.  
Participants 
Participants for the experiment are 118 senior auditors from a Big 4 public accounting 
firm who had a mean level of experience of approximately 46 months and a range of 30 to 80 
months. The participants were attending a firm-wide training program. Two participants failed 
to answer one or more of the dependent variable questions and are eliminated from all analyses, 
leaving 116 usable participant responses. There was no significant difference in experience 
level across treatment conditions and the participants were randomly assigned to treatment 
conditions. Participants were, on average, familiar with the accounting for estimates, with a 
mean response of 4.9 on a 7 point scale anchored on 1 = “not familiar at all”, 7 = “very 
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familiar”, and 4 = an unlabeled midpoint. Participants were relatively unfamiliar with the 
accounting for warranties, with a mean of 2.7 on the same scale. 
Procedures and Variables 
Audit Standard Manipulation 
All participants begin the experiment by reading through a case study describing 
eduTECH, a fictitious technology manufacturing company, and its complex warranty reserve 
estimation process. Early in the case study, participants are told that quantitative materiality is 
$2 million, which is a percentage of 3-year average revenues. Those in the judgment-based 
standard condition are further told that they will be implementing a new audit standard that 
allows them to use increased judgment in evaluating whether a misstatement is material. 
Participants are told that, not only can some small errors in estimates be considered material 
because of qualitative factors, but also some large errors in estimates can be considered NOT 
material because of qualitative factors. The rationale for, and background of, the new standard 
are also briefly described to participants. To make the judgment-based standard salient to 
participants in that condition, they are asked to document what they feel might be the standard 
setters’ rationale for making this change to the audit standard. 
In all conditions, participants learn that internal controls were appropriately tested and 
found to be operating effectively, and substantive tests of the accounting estimate conclude that 
management’s point estimate and estimation uncertainty range (+/- 4-times quantitative 
materiality) are reasonable. Shortly before making their first decision with respect to the 
potential of a material misstatement and ICFR material weakness, participants are all reminded 
of the quantitative materiality amount for the audit. Those in the judgment-based standard 
condition are also reminded of the new materiality standard that they are implementing. 
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Thinking Perspective Manipulation 
While reading the case information, participants are also given cues or “pointers” to 
help them understand the components of a client system and how they interact. These cues are 
designed to prompt participants to exhibit either a systems-thinking perspective or a 
reductionist-thinking perspective. The systems-thinking manipulation prompts participants to 
think of process inputs and outcomes (stocks and flows), both in general and within an 
accounting environment. They are also asked to consider and diagram interactions between 
processes. This manipulation was designed to increase holistic thinking within and between 
processes, and to allow participants to explore multiple cause-and-effect relations. As described 
in an earlier chapter, I operationalize the systems-thinking manipulation by introducing 
elements from the seven “critical skills of systems-thinking” of Richmond (1993): 
(1) Dynamic thinking – Change over time. See Figure 4. 
(2) Closed-loop thinking – Feedback loops. See Figure 5. 
(3) Generic thinking – Impact of unexpected events. See Figure 6. 
(4) Structural thinking – Narrative relating differing units of measure. See Figure 7. 
(5) Operational thinking – This concept was introduced via the feedback loops 
portion of the manipulation. See Figure 5. 
(6) Continuum thinking – The case study does this naturally, as the concepts include 
flows of dollar amounts, inventory units, etc. 
(7) Scientific thinking – Both thinking perspective manipulations were exposed to 
this systems-thinking skill through a description of the audit risk model. See 
Figure 8. While introducing this to participants in both conditions has the 
potential to weaken the systems-thinking manipulation with respect to the 
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reductionist-thinking manipulation, this is unlikely given the prevalence of this 
concept in the audit setting. 
The reductionist-thinking manipulation, by contrast, prompts participants to think of 
common business relationships between companies and their suppliers, customers, etc., or an 
economic web. The manipulation was based primarily on authoritative audit guidance, which 
provides series of factors for auditors to consider in understanding their clients and accounts. 
Both manipulations are based on Brewster (2011), but are simplified to be used by participants 
concurrently with the case information, instead of being used as a separate training tool. The 
manipulation acts as a series of cues to the experiment participants, which can be generalized to 
practical contexts, including audit decision support tools, formal training, etc.  
Dependent Measures  
After receiving information suggesting the previously audited warranty reserve estimate 
is likely incorrect, Participants are asked to make a final conclusion on the existence of a 
material misstatement and a final conclusion on the existence of an ICFR material weakness. 
Participants are asked “based on your understanding of materiality, if the FY2013 (i.e., 
9/30/2013) balance in warranty reserves were to remain unchanged at $25 million (and no 
disclosure made regarding the potential alternate balance), to what extent do you believe that 
2013 financial statements are materially misstated?” and “To what extent do you believe that 
there is a material weakness in eduTECH’s ICFR related to the FY2013 (i.e., 9/30/2013) 
balance in warranty reserves?” (emphasis is as depicted in the case). Participants respond on 7-
point scales anchored from 1 = “definitely NOT materially misstated” to 7 = “definitely 
materially misstated”, and from 1 = “definitely NOT an MW in ICFR” to 7 = “definitely an 
MW in ICFR”. The dependent measures, extent of belief that a material misstatement exists 
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and extent of belief that an ICFR material weakness exists, are the difference between these 
measures and the related questions asked prior to participants’ receiving the new information, 
using repeated measures ANOVA with timing (pre-and post-new-information) as the repeated 
factor. 
Process Measures 
To test H2a, participants are asked to indicate the extent to which their decisions about 
the presence or absence of a material misstatement are based on measures of attribution (e.g., 
Weiner 1985; Malle 2004): management’s ability and intelligence; management’s effort; 
warranty reserve complexity; and luck, or other factors outside management’s influence. 
Participants respond on a 7-point scale anchored on 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “an extreme 
amount”.  
Additionally, for H2b, participants are asked to indicate the extent to which their 
decisions about the presence or absence of a material misstatement is based on each of the three 
components of the audit risk model: effectiveness of eduTECH’s internal controls (representing 
control risk), inherent uncertainty in the warranty reserve process (representing inherent risk), 
and effectiveness of substantive testing (representing detection risk). Participants again respond 
on a 7-point scale anchored on 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “an extreme amount” for each risk 
component.  
To test H4a and H4b, participants respond to identical measures, after being asked the 
extent to which their decisions about the presence or absence of a material weakness in ICFR is 
based on each of those measures. Although participants are not asked to make their choices 
considering relative measures, the response graphs are aligned so that the attribution measures 
are viewed as relative to one another, as are the risk measures.  
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Chapter 6. Results  
Manipulation Checks 
I performed analyses to evaluate whether participants were affected by my manipulation 
as expected. First, prior to making the final material misstatement decision, participants rated 
the extent to which they believe that the ultimate potential warranty reserve expense is 
materially different from the previously audited balance on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 = 
“definitely NOT materially different” and 7 = “definitely materially different”. In untabulated 
analysis, results show a significant main effect of materiality standard condition on the 
response to this question (                           ). Participants in the prescriptive 
standard conditions (mean = 5.4) believed the difference was material to a greater extent than 
did participants in the judgment-based condition (mean = 4.8). Since the ultimate potential 
warranty reserve expense and previously audited reserve balance are held constant across 
conditions, this significant difference suggests that participants attended to the manipulation as 
expected.
7
 
Next, after responding to process questions and demographic questions, participants 
reported whether they were asked to think of the client’s mental model in terms of “stocks and 
flows, feedback loops, etc.” or “an ‘economic web’ of the client, competitors, suppliers, 
customers, etc.” Three participants failed this manipulation check, five did not respond, and 
four chose both selections. In total, 90% (89%) of participants in the systems- (reductionist-) 
                                                          
7
 In a separate question, participants reported whether they were asked to consider “a quantitative definition of 
materiality only (e.g., 0.4% of revenue)” or “a quantitative and qualitative definition of materiality (e.g., 0.4% of 
revenue and both quantitative and qualitative considerations in light of surrounding circumstances)”. Only one 
participant in the prescriptive standard condition did not answer, but 16 out of 56 incorrectly responded that they 
were asked to consider both quantitative and qualitative factors in determining materiality. My results are not 
meaningful or statistically significant if I remove participants that failed or did not respond to this manipulation. 
However, since audit standards allow auditors to uni-directionally evaluate materiality using qualitative factors, 
this “incorrect” response likely reflects the participants’ knowledge of the existing standard. I rely, therefore, on 
the procedures documented above, to give me comfort that this manipulation was successful. 
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thinking manipulation passed the manipulation check outright, while 93% (94%) of those that 
responded passed, suggesting a successful manipulation of induced thinking perspective. 
Statistical results are not significantly changed when I remove participants that failed or did not 
respond to this question. 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 
In H1, I predict that auditors will make different (i.e., higher) material misstatement 
decisions under prescriptive audit standards than under judgment-based standards, and this 
difference will be more pronounced for auditors with a systems-thinking perspective than those 
with a reductionist-thinking perspective. The dependent measure is the difference between final 
material misstatement decision and the initial decision.  
See Figure 9 for a graphical depiction of results and Table 1 for details; Panel A 
contains descriptive statistics supporting Figure 9 and Panel B details tests of planned contrasts 
and simple effects. To test for the predicted interaction, I performed a planned contrast 
regression, with weights of    and    for prescriptive and judgment-based materiality in the 
reductionist-thinking condition, and weights of    and    for prescriptive and judgment-based 
materiality in the systems-thinking condition. This contrast is significant                    . 
The residual between-participants variance is insignificant                     
                        , indicating that the hypothesized contrast describes the data well.
8
  
Two key features of the predicted interaction are (1) an overall main effect of the 
materiality standard condition and (2) a more pronounced effect for participants in the systems-
thinking perspective condition. Consistent with this, the main effect of the materiality standard 
                                                          
8
 I also ran a non-parametric Jonckheere-Terpstra test of the ordering of the four cells as a further robustness test 
of my contrast codes. This test provides evidence that the predicted ordering of my conditions is significant 
                       . 
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condition is significant                  . Additionally, the increase in judged material 
misstatement is driven almost exclusively by participants in the induced systems-thinking 
conditions. That is, the difference between judgment-based and prescriptive materiality 
standard conditions is significant in the systems-thinking condition                   but 
insignificant in the reductionist-thinking condition                  . 
I include the complete repeated measures ANOVA on which the contrast is based in 
Panel C of Table 1. Results indicate a significant overall within-subjects increase in material 
misstatement decision                 . Overall, as predicted, auditors in the judgment-based 
materiality standards condition are less likely to judge that the change in estimate represents a 
material misstatement of financial statements and, as predicted, that result is driven primarily 
by auditors induced to take on a systems-thinking perspective. Within a real audit environment 
similar to the conditions within this experiment (e.g., complex accounting estimates), 
implementation of judgment-based audit standards is more likely to affect the decisions of 
auditors that have a systems-thinking perspective.  
As an alternate test of H1, I repeat the tests above with the final material misstatement 
decision as the dependent measure, and the initial decision as a covariate. See Table 2 for 
details; Panel A details tests of planned contrasts and simple effects. I performed the planned 
contrast regression, with weights of    and    for prescriptive and judgment-based materiality 
in the reductionist-thinking condition, and weights of    and    for prescriptive and 
judgment-based materiality in the systems-thinking condition. This contrast approaches 
significance                    . As with the primary test, I also look for (1) an overall main 
effect of the materiality standard condition and (2) a more pronounced effect for participants in 
the systems-thinking perspective condition. See Figure 10 for a graphical depiction of the 
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means of participants’ final material misstatement judgments, controlling for their initial 
judgments. The pattern in Figure 10 is, as expected, similar to that in Figure 9, which depicts 
the mean difference between final and initial judgments in each condition. The main effect of 
the materiality standard condition is not significant by traditional measures, but, as expected, 
comes close                  . Additionally, the final material misstatement judgment is 
driven more by participants in the induced systems-thinking conditions than those in the 
reductionist-thinking conditions. The difference between judgment-based and prescriptive 
materiality standard conditions approaches significance in the systems-thinking condition 
                  but is insignificant in the reductionist-thinking condition            
      . I include the complete ANCOVA on which the contrast is based in Panel B of Table 2. 
Overall, as predicted, auditors in the judgment-based materiality standards condition are less 
likely to judge that the change in estimate represents a material misstatement of financial 
statements and, as predicted, that result is driven primarily by auditors induced to take on a 
systems-thinking perspective.  
Tests of H1 Process Measures – Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
Tests of Hypothesis 2a 
Hypothesis 2a predicts, relative to the level of attribution applied to management ability 
and management effort, systems-thinkers in the study will attribute more causality to process 
complexity than will reductionist-thinkers. That is, systems-thinkers are more likely to 
recognize the role of process complexity in causing potential misstatements in complex 
accounts than are reductionist-thinkers. To test this, I develop two causal attribution measures, 
one each for ability-to-complexity and effort-to-complexity:     
                                  
                         
  . 
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Each raw ratio compares the two judgments such that the value approaches 1 as the internal 
(either ability or effort) and external (complexity) judgments align near the same value on the 
7-point scales described above. The natural log ensures that ratios are treated the same on both 
sides of that alignment point (and the value approaches zero as judgments align near the same 
value).
9
 A higher value for each measure suggests more attribution to either ability or effort 
and/or less attribution to process complexity. Based on the theory described earlier, I predict 
that this measure will be higher for reductionist-thinkers than for systems-thinkers (i.e., a larger 
denominator and/or smaller numerator for systems-thinkers). 
Results of this analysis are included in Table 3. Descriptive statistics in Panel A suggest 
that, across materiality standard conditions, the effort-related causal attribution measure for 
reductionist-thinkers is greater (           ) than the measure for systems-thinkers 
(           ). ANOVA results for this measure (Panel B) indicate that this association 
with the manipulated perspective condition is significant (               ). Systems-thinkers 
attribute more causality to the complexity of the warranty reserve process, relative to 
management effort, in explaining the potential material misstatement, than do reductionist-
thinkers. Tests of the ability-related causal attribution measure (Panel C), however, resulted in 
non-significant effects                  . This evidence supports H2a for one of the two 
causal attribution measures. 
Tests of Hypothesis 2b 
Hypothesis 2b predicts that systems-thinking auditors’ evaluations of accounting 
estimate process complexity will be more closely correlated with their evaluations of inherent 
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 For example, a ratio of 1:5 results in a raw measure of 0.2, while a measure of 5:1 results in a raw measure of 5. 
The latter is much farther from 1 than the former. In this case, however, 1:5 and 5:1 tell the same relational story, 
so the natural log simply transforms 1/5 into -1.609 and 5 into +1.609. 
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risk than those of reductionist-thinking auditors. This higher correlation is suggestive of 
systems-thinkers’ holistic thinking – it enables them to understand how process complexity 
affects both the audited financial statements, and the process of auditing those financial 
statements. Table 4 contains details of the tests of this hypothesis. I evaluate the Pearson 
correlations measuring the relation between attributions to process complexity and extent to 
which judgments were based on inherent risk. Table 4 provides evidence of a significant 
difference between the correlations of systems-thinkers and reductionist-thinkers. For example, 
across audit standard conditions, there is a positive and significant correlation between these 
two measures for systems-thinkers (                         ), but the correlation for 
reductionist-thinkers is non-significant (                         ). The difference 
between these correlations is highly significant (                               ). 
Similar results are found when the correlations are compared under prescriptive standards alone 
and under judgment-based standards alone. Systems-thinkers more closely align the impact of 
process complexity and the inherent risk measure in the audit risk model, providing support for 
H2b.  
Tests of Mediation 
In the preceding analyses, I provided evidence that the systems-thinking perspective 
affects auditors’ consideration of process complexity in their audit conclusions as well as the 
overall audit process. Next, I test for a significant mediation effect of causal attribution and 
holistic thinking on the results of H1. See a graphical representation of the full mediation model 
at Figure 11 and mediation results in Table 5. The model allows the three mediators to act as 
mechanisms through which thinking perspective moderates the effect of audit standard type on 
auditor material misstatement decisions. I use the regression approach of mediation analysis 
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(Baron and Kenny 1986) with the hypothesized contrast coded thinking perspective by audit 
standard interaction as the independent variable, change in material misstatement decision as 
the dependent variable, and the two causal attribution measures as well as a holistic thinking 
measure (created for the mediation analysis and described next) as parallel mediators.  
I developed a measure of holistic thinking,     
                      
                         
   for use in the 
mediation analysis. Since responses to both the inherent risk and attribution to complexity 
questions are collected on 7-point scales, similar responses to both questions suggests that 
participants recognized the relation between them. As the two numbers move farther apart, the 
measure moves higher or lower, suggesting participants do not recognize them as related. As 
with the measure used in H2a, the natural log ensures that ratios are treated the same as the 
value approaches unity from either direction. Values closer to zero represent greater holistic 
thinking. An untabulated ANOVA suggests a significant main effect of perspective (systems- 
vs. reductionist-thinking) on this measure                               .
10
 
Panel A of Table 5 compares the results of two regression models. The “Total Effects 
Model” duplicates the H1 ANOVA results and the “Full Direct Effects Model” depicts the 
results of a regression including the same variables plus the three mediator measures and the 
interactions between those measures and the audit standard type. Two of the three potential 
mediators are significantly predicted by the thinking perspective condition, as hypothesized and 
tested above (causal attribution (effort), coefficient                       ; and holistic 
                                                          
10
 Untabulated means are as follows:                                     . However, since the measure 
can be either positive or negative, I ran the same ANOVA using only participants whose measures were   . 
Untabulated results                               suggest that reductionist-thinkers’ scores were 
significantly farther from zero              than systems-thinkers’ scores             . Using only 
participants whose measures were   , untabulated results                               suggest that the 
measures are not significantly different across thinking-perspective conditions. 
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thinking, coefficient                       ).
 11
 Since the primary test of H1 is the 
significance of a planned contrast, the primary evidence of mediation is a reduction in the 
coefficient and significance of that planned contrast in the full direct effects model (coefficient 
                      ) relative to the total effects model (coefficient                  
     ); see Table 5, Panel B.12 Additionally, a Sobel-Goodman test suggests that my three 
parallel mediators together mediate 23 percent of the total effect that the interacted variables 
have on material misstatement decisions. These results support partial mediation. As a 
robustness test, I also performed bias corrected and accelerated bootstrapping for second stage 
moderated mediation as suggested in model 15 of Preacher & Hayes (2008). Using this method, 
I obtained qualitatively similar results for mediation of the effects of the unweighted interaction 
of my independent variables on my primary dependent variable.
13
 Together, this evidence 
further supports H2a and H2b.
  
Additional Analyses 
In this section, I provide additional background analyses in support of H1, H2a, and 
H2b. The dependent measure for H1 is the difference between final material misstatement 
decision and the initial decision. See Table 6, Panel A for descriptive statistics describing the 
mean initial and final material misstatement decisions for each condition. Panel B depicts the 
                                                          
11
 I retain the ability-related measure in the mediation analysis, even though the primary analysis resulted in non-
significant effects, because non-tabulated means across thinking perspective are directionally consistent with my 
prediction                                       and theory predicts that both measures will explain the 
overall results. Mediation results are inferentially similar when run with only the effort-related measure. 
12
 Note that the standard mediation model (Baron & Kenny 1986) includes a significant path between the 
mediators and the dependent variable. In my model, the interaction between standard type and causal attribution 
(effort) is significant (coefficient                        ) but the interaction between standard type and 
holistic thinking measure is not significant (coefficient                         ). However, since the primary 
hypothesis relies on a contrast coded test, I do not rely on these measures. 
13
 I calculate the 90 percent confidence interval (CI) and 5,000 replications to test for the conditional indirect effect 
of the mediating variables on participants’ material misstatement decisions. Results are qualitatively similar to 
those presented in the paper. However, this model does not consider the planned contrast hypothesized in H1 and 
so the results only reflect a moderated mediation of the unweighted interaction between my independent variables. 
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ANOVA for the initial material misstatement decision. Note that neither independent measure, 
nor their interaction is statistically significant in predicting the dependent measure. This is not 
unexpected as no information had yet been presented suggesting a potential material 
misstatement. Panel C shows the ANOVA for the final material misstatement decision. Given 
the significant change in decisions that form the basis of H1 tests, the fact that neither 
independent measure, nor their interaction is statistically significant in explaining the 
dependent measure is somewhat surprising. However, this is likely explained by the fact that 
the mean initial decision of systems-thinkers in the prescriptive standard condition was the 
lowest of all conditions and their mean final decision was the highest (           and     , 
respectively) while the mean initial decision of systems-thinkers in the judgment-based 
standard condition was the highest of all conditions and their mean final decision was the 
lowest (           and     , respectively). Reductionist-thinkers across conditions 
increased their material misstatement conclusions approximately equally across standard-type. 
The dependent measure for H2a is based on ratios of attributions to two internal factors 
(management’s ability and intelligence, and management’s effort) and one external factor 
(warranty reserve complexity). Attributions were on 7-point scales anchored on 1 = “not at all” 
and 7 = “an extreme amount”. See Table 7, Panel A for descriptive statistics describing the 
mean attributions for each condition. Panels B, C, and D depict the ANOVA attributions to 
ability, effort, and complexity, respectively. These data are provided for informational purposes 
only.
 
Tests of Hypothesis 3 
In H3, I predict that auditors are more likely to conclude that a material weakness in 
ICFR exists when they are reductionist-thinkers than when they are systems-thinkers, and 
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reductionist-thinkers are more likely to conclude that a material weakness in ICFR exists under 
prescriptive audit standards than under judgment-based standards. The dependent variable is 
the difference between final ICFR material weakness decision and the initial decision.  
See Figure 12 for a graphical depiction of results and Table 8 for details; Panel A 
contains descriptive statistics supporting Figure 12 and Panel B details tests of planned 
contrasts. To test for the predicted interaction, I performed a planned contrast regression, with 
weights of    and    for prescriptive and judgment-based materiality in the reductionist-
thinking condition, and weights of    for both prescriptive and judgment-based materiality in 
the systems-thinking condition. This contrast is not significant                    , nor are 
any simple effects (not tabulated). As such, H3 is not supported by my results. I include the 
complete repeated measures ANOVA on which the contrast is based in Panel C of Table 8. 
Results indicate a significant overall within-subjects increase in ICFR material weakness 
decision                 . No other variables are significant in my primary model. 
Since my tests using the primary model provided non-significant results, I performed 
additional tests to evaluate potential reasons. The dependent measure for H3 is the difference 
between the final ICFR material weakness decision and the initial decision. See Table 9, Panel 
A for descriptive statistics describing the mean initial and final ICFR material weakness 
decisions for each condition. Panel B depicts the ANOVA for the initial decision. This analysis 
shows a main effect of thinking-perspective on participants’ initial ICFR material weakness 
decision that approaches significance (                . While I do not predict such an effect, 
it is not inconsistent with system dynamics theory. Given identical information, systems-
thinkers were significantly less likely to suggest that a material weakness in ICFR existed prior 
to receiving additional information about a potential misstatement. This suggests that systems-
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thinkers may have better recognized the high quality of internal controls as described in the 
narrative, and their likely ability to find, prevent, and fix potential financial statement errors. 
However, my study does not include process measures related to the initial decision, so this is 
speculative and may be something to consider in future research. Panel C shows the ANOVA 
for the final material weakness decision, and reveals that neither independent measure, nor their 
interaction is statistically significant in predicting the dependent measure. 
Next, as an additional test of check-the-box material weakness decisions, I repeated the 
ANOVA used in the main test of H3, but added an additional variable, participants’ material 
misstatement decisions. See Table 10 for a summary of results. In Panel A, I show the effect of 
my two manipulated variables plus the change in material misstatement judgments on the 
change in ICFR material weakness decisions. The only variable that is significant in predicting 
change in ICFR material weakness decisions is change in material misstatement decisions 
(                ). Similarly, in Panel B, I show that the only variable that is significant in 
predicting the final material weakness decision is the final material misstatement decision 
(                ). This supports the conjecture that my systems-thinking manipulation was 
not effective in changing auditors’ beliefs about the mechanical nature of the relationship 
between identified material misstatements and material weaknesses in ICFR, despite system 
dynamics theory suggesting that such an effect should exist. 
There are several possible explanations for the lack of results related to H3, some of 
which I explore above. For example, it is possible that my systems-thinking intervention, while 
it affected the way participants in my experiment thought about material misstatement, may not 
have been strong enough to affect the more process-based ICFR thought process. Alternately, 
given the different focus on substantive audit procedures and internal control procedures in a 
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traditional audit setting, it is also possible that the systems-thinking manipulations I chose in 
my study were not related closely enough to the process-based ICFR analyses. Still another 
possibility is that, as described earlier, the audit standard manipulation, which only altered how 
auditors define materiality, is too far removed from the ICFR process to have had an impact on 
related decisions. Recall that the primary audit standard related to ICFR judgments, Audit 
Standard 5, was not manipulated or even mentioned in the case study. I relied on participants’ 
knowledge of the standard in this secondary test of my theory. Future experiments might take a 
more pointed approach of manipulating this specific standard to evaluate the differential effect 
on systems- vs. reductionist-thinkers. It is interesting to note that, after receiving information 
about a potential misstatement, all participants increased their ICFR material weakness 
decisions to approximately the midpoint of the scale. While systems-thinkers increased their 
material weakness decisions more than predicted (relative to reductionist-thinkers), they did 
not, on average, increase them to a level that would be considered a “definite” material 
weakness. It is conceivable that auditors are simply not as comfortable making material 
weakness decisions as they are material misstatement decisions. This is also something that can 
be explored in future research. 
Tests of H3 Process Measures – Hypotheses 4a and 4b 
Tests of Hypothesis 4a 
In this section, I describe results of tests for H4a and H4b, however, given the lack of 
results related to H3, I do not perform mediation analyses to test the process. Hypothesis 4a 
predicts that, systems-thinkers, relative to reductionist-thinkers, are more likely to apply greater 
attribution to management’s effort and ability than to process complexity, since the former 
better represent management’s (positive) ability to implement effective internal controls. To 
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test this, I use the same two causal attribution measures used in tests of H2a, one each for 
ability-to-complexity and effort-to-complexity:     
                                  
                         
  . To test H4a, 
however, I use responses to attribution questions specific to participants’ final ICFR material 
weakness decisions. As before, a higher value for each measure suggests more attribution to 
either ability or effort and/or less attribution to process complexity. Based on the theory 
described earlier, I predict that this measure will be lower for reductionist-thinkers than for 
systems-thinkers (i.e., a smaller denominator and/or larger numerator for systems-thinkers). 
Results of this analysis are included in Table 11. Descriptive statistics in Panel A 
suggest that, across materiality standard conditions, the effort-related causal attribution 
measure for reductionist-thinkers is greater (          ) than the measure for systems-
thinkers (          ), contrary to my prediction. The same is true for the ability-related 
causal attribution measure (           for reductionist-thinkers and           for 
systems-thinkers). As I describe in supplemental analyses below (see Table 13), systems-
thinkers attributed more causality to process complexity than to management attributes, 
contrary to my prediction. Hypotheses H4a and H4b were based on a prediction that systems-
thinkers would likely conclude that no material weakness in ICFR exists. Supplemental 
analysis shows that systems-thinkers, on average, increased their beliefs as to the existence of 
an ICFR material weakness such that their final judgments were at the middle of the scale (see 
Table 9).  I am unable to interpret participants’ choices since final decisions were not 
significantly predicted by my manipulations, however, I speculate that participants, whether 
they believed an ICFR material weakness existed or not, were unwilling to make choices below 
the midpoint given the existence of a material misstatement. This suggests that the check-the-
box mentality ingrained by certain purportedly judgment-based audit standards (e.g., Audit 
62 
Standard No. 5, as described earlier) is so strong as to not be affected by the level of systems-
thinking I introduced in this study. I document additional analyses below to further evaluate the 
unpredicted response. 
Tests of Hypothesis 4b 
Hypothesis 4b predicts that systems-thinking auditors’ evaluations of management 
ability and effort will be more closely correlated with their evaluations of internal control 
effectiveness than those of reductionist-thinking auditors. This higher correlation is suggestive 
of systems-thinkers’ holistic thinking. Table 12 contains details of the tests of this hypothesis. I 
evaluate the Pearson correlations measuring the relation between attributions to management 
ability and participants’ judgment of internal control effectiveness (see Panel A), and 
correlations measuring the relation between attributions to management effort and participants’ 
judgment of internal control effectiveness (see Panel B). This analysis provides some evidence 
of a significant difference between the correlations of systems-thinkers and reductionist-
thinkers in the ability-related measure, but not the effort-related measure. For example, across 
audit standard conditions, there is a positive and significant correlation between these two 
measures for systems-thinkers (                         ), and a positive and significant 
correlation for reductionist-thinkers (                         ). The difference between 
these correlations is weakly significant (                               ). However, all 
correlations in this analysis are significant, except for the effort-related correlation for 
reductionist-thinkers under prescriptive standards (                         ). Thus, 
overall, this analysis provides only very weak support for H4b. Generally, it seems that 
participants in all conditions correlated management internal attributes with internal control 
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effectiveness. While not the focus of this study, this suggests that auditors, in general, better 
understand the Control Risk element of the Audit Risk Model than the Inherent Risk element. 
Additional Analyses 
Next, I provide additional background analyses related to H4a and H4b. These 
hypotheses related to process measures for ICFR material weakness decisions are, generally, 
not supported, or only weakly supported by my results. The dependent measure for H4a is 
based on ratios of attributions to two internal factors (management’s ability and intelligence, 
and management’s effort) and one external factor (warranty reserve complexity). Attributions 
were on 7-point scales anchored on 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “an extreme amount”. For 
informational purposes, I include additional data in Table 13. See Panel A for descriptive 
statistics describing the mean attributions for each condition. Panels B, C, and D depict the 
ANOVA attributions to ability, effort, and complexity, respectively. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions and Discussion 
I present evidence supporting the prediction that implementing judgment-based 
accounting and audit standards may not be sufficient, by itself, to reduce the check-the-box 
mentality that auditors are sometimes accused of, particularly in highly complex accounting 
contexts. The study contributes to research on audit regulation as well as auditor decisions at 
the planning and conclusion stages of the audit process. My primary prediction was that the 
auditor participants in my study would be more likely to decide that the potential misstatement 
is a material misstatement under the current prescriptive audit standard than under the 
judgment-based standard developed for this study, and that the difference in judgments would 
be more pronounced for auditors with a systems-thinking perspective than those with a 
reductionist-thinking perspective. My study finds that reductionist-thinkers (an intervention 
based on current audit practice and professional guidance) do not make significantly different 
material misstatement decisions under existing prescriptive standards vs. hypothetical 
judgment-based standards. Systems-thinkers do, however, produce predicted and significantly 
different results. Not only do participants in the study make judgments more consistent with the 
use of professional judgment after being introduced to systems-thinking concepts, but they are 
more likely to recognize that dynamic process complexity is a causal factor in accounting 
outcomes and they more closely align process complexity with audit risk. Thus, my research 
contributes to systems-thinking literature by identifying possible processes by which systems-
thinking affects judgments. 
However, this evidence is significant only in relation to material misstatement 
conclusions in my study. My manipulations had no significant effect on auditor check-the-box 
decisions related to ICFR material weaknesses, suggesting that future research may be required 
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to further understand how auditors think about this very important audit process and 
conclusion. I offer several potential reasons for this lack of significant results, some of which 
may be explored in future research. For example, perhaps a stronger manipulation is required to 
change the decisions of experienced audit professionals. This is something that might be better 
tested using students over a longer (potentially multiple-day) study. Students can be asked to 
analyze the effectiveness of a process and the appropriateness of the result (analog to ICFR and 
substantive or financial statement decisions). I also speculate that the systems-thinking 
manipulations I chose in my study were not related closely enough to the process-based ICFR 
analyses. Future research might study alternate systems-thinking skills that are more closely 
related to ICFR. The results of these and other future studies might be used by practitioners to 
develop practical tools, training, or methodologies that might be beneficial in evaluating both 
material misstatement and material weakness conclusions. 
Another interesting area for future research is the directionality of auditor decisions 
when determining the association between material misstatements and material weaknesses in 
ICFR. Specifically, when an auditor identifies a deficiency in ICFR during an integrated audit, 
it should signal the potential for increased risk of material misstatement (PCAOB 2007a), a 
predictive relation. Accordingly, auditors should compensate for an increase in control risk by 
performing additional substantive procedures (PCAOB 2010a). Interestingly, both the SEC and 
the PCAOB suggest that the opposite tends to be the case. Auditors rely on the identification of 
material misstatements to determine whether an ICFR material weakness exists (e.g., Croteau 
2013; Franzel 2014), a diagnostic relation (note that a material misstatement of the financial 
statements is a potential signal of an ICFR material weakness, but not an absolute causal 
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factor). Future research might look into the learned or innate characteristics that make auditors 
more prone to making decisions in this presumably backward order. 
I add to systems-thinking and audit decision-aid research by evaluating the effect of 
relatively minimal cues to systems-thinking. Prior research in this area finds that, while some 
individuals innately think in systems, most do not. The skill is generally learned over time 
through training and years of work experience (e.g., Frank 2006; Davidz, Nightingale, & 
Rhodes 2008). Participants in my study spent between 14 and 50 minutes (mean of 28 minutes) 
on the entire task, including reading the case study, being cued on thinking perspective, and 
answering all questions. Even with this minimal intervention, participants showed a statistically 
significant difference in both material misstatement decisions and in their relative judgments 
about complexity between the two thinking perspective conditions. This suggests that even 
simple cues or decision aids may be useful in reducing auditors’ check-the-box mentality, in 
certain contexts. The lack of an effect on ICFR material weakness decisions, however, suggests 
that, perhaps this mentality is too ingrained in auditors to be affected without a stronger or 
more consistent intervention.  
The study also has limitations or creates opportunities that can be explored in future 
research. For example, my study evaluates the reduction of check-the-box thinking through 
systems-thinking in a specific audit context. I manipulate a specific audit standard and include 
detailed auditee details which drive my predictions of more extreme judgments; this was done 
in order to cleanly test the theory. There are likely to be context-specific situations in which 
systems-thinkers’ judgments are less extreme than those of reductionist-thinkers. Future 
research might look into those situations. There are also likely to be context-specific situations 
in which systems-thinking may not improve auditors’ decisions at all. For example, less 
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complex financial statement accounts, or those that require less estimation or speculation, may 
be better evaluated in a linear, or check-the-box fashion. An example of this might be physical 
inventory counts (though, arguably, deeper thought into the business might still lead to better 
valuations of obsolete inventory). Future research might delve into the limits of systems-
thinking usefulness in an audit context. 
Additionally, I evaluate auditors’ ultimate decisions related to whether a potential 
misstatement of an account should be considered material. Future studies might explore interim 
steps in that decision process. As referenced earlier, the decision process for determining that a 
material misstatement exists is predicated on whether the auditor is comfortable that 
management’s estimate is reasonable (e.g., Rowe 2013; Peecher et al. 2013). By breaking down 
the material misstatement decision process, future research can tease out whether systems-
thinking affects, for example, auditors’ comfort with management’s estimate vs. their 
perceptions of investors’ information needs. This might inform regulators as to the most 
effective future changes to audit standards.  
Another limitation of my study is that my audit standard manipulation was specific to 
judgments of material misstatements within financial statements, with the material weakness 
judgment included as a secondary analysis. Future research might specifically manipulate 
prescriptive standards related to ICFR in order to more directly evaluate check-the-box 
decisions in this context. Additionally, audit firms implement decision-aids so that less 
experienced staff can make decisions as if they were more experienced. Future research might 
explore the interaction between the level of specificity in audit decision aids and thinking 
perspective. My study suggests that open-ended or thought-provoking decision aids may induce 
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a systems-thinking perspective, which may improve auditor decisions incrementally over 
traditional decision aids. 
In my study, I hold constant across conditions the event that was the underlying cause 
of the potential misstatement. Future research in this area may manipulate the type of 
underlying event (e.g., standard business event vs. extremely rare event). It seems likely that an 
extremely rare event might stand out whether an auditor is a systems-thinker or a reductionist-
thinker, whereas it is possible that the effect of more common, but impactful events, might be 
better recognized and incorporated into decisions by auditors trained to think more deeply 
about cause and effect and the effects of complexity. 
Another potential limitation of this study is the nature of the causal attribution 
questions. Experimental conditions (limited time and professional participants) required that 
these questions be asked in a scalar format, which limits the implications that can be drawn 
from responses. Future research might further explore causal attribution theory in this context 
by allowing for more open-ended responses to such questions, perhaps in a non-professional 
(e.g., classroom) setting. Finally, system dynamics literature suggests that thinking perspective 
is partially learned and partially innate, and I only focus on the former. Future research might 
explore the predominance of reductionist- versus systems-thinking in the audit profession at 
various levels. This research might also lead to an understanding of the degree to which 
individuals with certain thinking perspectives self-select into the profession, and the degree to 
which the profession induces certain perspectives over time. This research might be conducted, 
for example, with a longitudinal study of accounting students throughout their time in the 
university, etc.  
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Appendix A. Experimental Design 
Case Study 
Participants receive case information about eduTECH, a company with a complex (detail and 
dynamic) warranty estimation process. Participants assume the role of audit senior for the client. The 
materiality standard manipulation is introduced; all participants are given quantitative materiality 
guidance, one-half are also introduced to a hypothetical standard allowing bi-directional qualitative 
materiality. 
 
Throughout the case, participants receive cues to help them understand the components of a client 
system, and how those components interact. The thinking perspective manipulation is introduced; all 
participants receive pointers (in call-out boxes): one-half are based on current audit guidance; one-
half are based in system dynamics processes. 
 
All participants are given the same quantitative materiality, warranty reserve point estimate, and 
estimation error range (4x quantitative materiality in each direction). 
↓ 
Initial Judgment 
Participants are asked: 
 The extent to which they 
believe the point estimate is 
materially correct (not correct 
= material misstatement) 
 The extent to which they 
believe there is a material 
weakness in ICFR 
→ 
New Information 
Participants receive information that the originally audited 
estimate is likely less than the amount that will be 
ultimately realized. The difference is 3-times quantitative 
materiality (greater than quantitative materiality but within 
the original estimation error range). 
 
The difference was caused by an event that occurred before 
year-end but primarily affects future warranty expenses. 
  ↓ 
Second Judgment 
Participants are asked: 
 The extent to which they believe the recorded point estimate (still based on the original amount) 
is materially misstated 
 The extent to which they believe there is a material weakness in ICFR 
↓ 
Self-Reporting of Process Measures for Second Judgment 
Participants separately self-report the extent to which their MM and MW decisions were based on: 
 Management’s ability and intelligence 
 Management’s effort 
 Warranty reserve complexity 
 Luck, or other factors outside management’s influence 
Participants separately self-report the extent to which their MM and MW decisions were based on: 
 The effectiveness of eduTECH’s internal controls  
 Inherent uncertainty in the warranty reserve process 
 The effectiveness of substantive testing 
↓ 
Post Experimental Questionnaire and Demographics 
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Appendix B. Full Experimental Instrument 
The experimental instrument begins on the next page. All manipulations are highlighted 
within the instrument. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
conditions. Conditions are based on manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective 
(reductionist- and systems-thinking) and two levels of audit standards prescription (prescriptive 
and judgment-based). 
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General Instructions 
 
1. This study has two parts. Please read the instructions for each part carefully, then provide 
your answers to the questions in each part. 
2. Please consider your answers carefully before providing them. For research reasons, you 
will not be able to go back and make changes once they have been turned in. 
3. We acknowledge that the information provided in the case is simplified and considerably 
less than what you would normally have during an audit. Nevertheless, we are interested 
in your professional judgment given the available information. Please note that there are 
no “correct” answers to the audit case questions. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation!  
 
Please begin Part 1 now. 
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Part 1: Case Study 
 
 
 
Please carefully read through the following case study, which is based on a hypothetical scenario 
about a hypothetical company in the technology manufacturing industry. 
You will be asked to complete a series of questions at the end of the study. 
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Background 
Client company background  
Your audit client is eduTECH (Stock Symbol: EDTCH), a publicly traded electronic devices 
company that develops and manufactures computers, tablet computers and related accessories 
for use in K-8 education.  Their year-end is September 30, to roughly coincide with that of their 
customers. Your team performs interim audit procedures at various times throughout the year, 
but primarily in July and August. Final audit procedures typically begin in October, shortly after 
the fiscal year-end. 
 
eduTECH is a large client for your office, with significant billable hours and audit fees. Your audit 
team has been working on the eduTECH audit for the past three years, and you feel that your team 
has a strong working relationship with both the audit committee and management. Your 
impression is that management is competent and cooperative in handling audit issues. 
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Professional standards require that auditors understand their clients and 
their clients’ environments.  
 
Together, the client and its environment form a “system” – a group of 
interacting or interrelated components that form a complex and unified 
whole. Your mental representation of that system's interactions, and the 
behavior those interactions can produce is your “mental model”.  
 
This mental model is used to develop expectations, which are later compared 
to client-provided evidence. 
 
Throughout this study, you will receive pointers (in call-out boxes like this 
one) that will help you understand the components of a client system and how 
they interact, in order to develop an accurate mental model related to a 
specific account balance and, more importantly, how you might audit that 
balance. 
 
Toward the end of the study, you will be asked to document your own mental 
model related to a specific eduTECH account. 
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Client Business 
The e*Tablet is eduTECH’s primary product, and has been since its introduction, when it replaced 
the previous desktop model in November 2010. The majority of e*Tablet sales have been to state 
and local school boards, and sales are spread approximately evenly throughout the year.  
The e*Tablet sells for $899 and eduTECH has sold approximately 1,590,000 units as of 2013 
(approximately 420,000 in FY 2011; 525,000 in FY 2012; 645,000 sold and delivered in FY 2013).  
 
 
 
The e*Tablet has received positive press from education groups for its unique design, industry 
leading durability and combination of learning and entertainment opportunities for K-8 students. 
eduTECH's recent success has attracted the attention of additional investors and placed increased 
pressure on management to maintain recent growth and earnings. To maintain the trend of strong 
financial results and respond to increasing competition, eduTECH management has focused on 
increasing production and reducing costs.  
In March 2013 (i.e., half-way through the fiscal year), eduTECH contracted with a new supplier of 
dedicated graphics processing units (DGPUs). This new supplier has committed to providing more 
cost-effective and lighter-weight DGPUs than its competitors. Because of the reduction in weight, 
eduTECH markets this generation of e*Tablet as “gen. 2”. The e*Tablet production process did not 
undergo any other changes in FY2013. 
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[Manipulation 1 – Prescriptive Standard] 
 
Audit Background 
It is October 2013 and you are in the middle of year-end audit procedures for the September 30, 
2013 financial statements. Because eduTECH is a publicly traded company, your team will be 
issuing opinions on both internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) and on the financial 
statements. 
As the lead senior on the engagement, you are responsible for wrapping up the most important 
line items on the financial statements, including some that you may not have been directly 
involved in auditing, like the warranty reserve account. 
Your team calculates quantitative materiality as 0.4% of average (3-year) revenue.  
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[Manipulation 1 – Judgment-based Standard] 
 
Audit Background 
It is October 2013 and you are in the middle of year-end audit procedures for the September 30, 
2013 financial statements. Because eduTECH is a publicly traded company, your team will be 
issuing opinions on both internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) and on the financial 
statements. 
As the lead senior on the engagement, you are responsible for wrapping up the most important 
line items on the financial statements, including some that you may not have been directly 
involved in auditing, like the warranty reserve account. 
Your team calculates overall quantitative materiality as 0.4% of average (3-year) revenue. 
However, auditing standards are clear that materiality is a matter of professional judgment and is 
influenced by the auditor's perception of the needs of users of financial statements.  
Assume, for purposes of this case, that changes were recently made to audit standards and your 
team is applying the new standard regarding how the auditor is to consider both quantitative 
and qualitative factors in assessing materiality. This new standard is at least partially motivated 
by the 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (aka, the ”Pozen Committee report”), which 
suggested that “bright lines or quantitative methods are not appropriate in determining the 
materiality of an error to annual financial statements.”  
While audit standards have long stressed that some quantitatively small errors in estimates can 
be material because of qualitative factors, the hypothetical new standard also stresses, in line with 
the recommendations of the Pozen Committee, that some quantitatively large errors in 
estimates can be considered NOT material because of qualitative factors. 
Take a few seconds to write down, very briefly, what you think the standard setters’ rationale 
would have been for making this change to the audit standard.   
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[Manipulation 2 – Systems-Thinking Prompt] 
81 
Mental Model, Step 1: Identify Stocks and Flows 
 
Your first step in understanding the client system related to a financial statement 
account is to identify its stocks and flows. A stock is a quantity possessing an initial 
value that is increased by inflows and decreased by outflows over time. The stock, 
therefore, measures something at a point in time, while the flows reflect changes over 
time. 
 
eduTECH’s warranty reserve for the e*Tablet, at any given time, is the stock, in this 
case. There are things that can cause the stock (reserve amount) to go up or down over 
time. 
 
The concept is similar to a balloon, where the air inside the balloon is the stock, and 
movement of air into the balloon and out of the balloon are both flows.  
 
The amount of air in a balloon is 
determined by the amount of air flowing 
in and out. This example can be 
graphically represented using a 
stock/flow diagram. 
 
 
Imagine you and a friend each decide to blow up a balloon. You blow up your balloon 
manually; you take a breath and blow it into the balloon. But each time you take another 
breath, a little air leaks out. See the graphic below, on the left. Your friend is lazy, and uses 
an automatic pump, so the inflow is a bit smoother. See the graphic on the right. You each 
tie off the end of your balloon with a simple knot which will, of course, allow the air to 
slowly leak out. You leave your balloon at home and, as expected, over many days, your 
balloon deflates. Your friend, on the other hand, decided to take the balloon to a party, 
where somebody stuck it with a pin, causing the air to flow out of the balloon very quickly. 
  
 
 
Similarly, there are factors that cause 
warranty reserve to increase and factors 
that cause warranty reserve to decrease 
over time. Soon, we will explore a few of 
these factors. 
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Mental Model, Step 1 (continued): Identify Stocks and Flows 
 
Changes in stocks can also be graphically 
presented as a bi-flow. This just means that any 
changes in or out of the stock are shown together. 
Bi-flows are typically used to simplify a graph 
instead of using both an inflow and outflow. 
 
 
Financial stocks exist at multiple levels. For example, the table below shows 
inventory value, which is directly associated with a financial statement account, but it 
also shows inventory cost per unit, which may change over time so that a product 
purchased in month 1 does not cost the same as the identical product purchased in 
month 3. 
 
Stock (point in time) Inflows (increases over time) Outflows (decreases over time) 
Inventory cost per unit Decreased market supply 
Raw material shortage 
Decreased market demand 
Negotiated discounts 
Inventory value Purchases of inventory Consumption through 
manufacturing or sale 
Obsolescence 
 
A few other important facts about the characteristics of stocks and flows are: 
• Stocks can have multiple in- and outflows. For example 
o Raw material inventory value is decreased through: 
 Objectively measurable activities like manufacturing and direct sale 
of materials 
 Subjective evaluations like obsolescence estimates 
• Stocks allow for time delays. A delay exists when the outflow is postponed 
relative to the inflow, so that the initial inflow is maintained in the system as a 
stock. An example would be a moving escalator. When people move onto the 
escalator, they are now a stock but there is a delay for the outflow. They do not 
move off of the escalator until they reach the end. 
• Unexpected events can have big implications for stocks and flows. For example, 
in the late 1970s, Atari video games were the rage. Sales (the flow) doubled 
every year from 1976 through 1982. The market became saturated very 
abruptly, though, in 1980-81, and revenues (the stock) dropped from $2 billion 
in 1982 to $100 million by 1984. Atari never saw it coming. 
 
While all of this might seem very intuitive, history shows that people have difficulty 
differentiating between stocks and flows. A good rule of thumb is to remember that 
stocks pertain to a specific point in time, whereas flows pertain to changes over time. 
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[Manipulation 2 – Reductionist-Thinking Prompt] 
 
Mental Model, Step 1: Obtain an Understanding of the Client & Industry 
 
Your first step in understanding the client system related to a financial statement 
account is to understand the nature of the client itself. This helps you understand 
the systems within the company, how it does business, and how it records the 
transactions related to the business. When understanding the nature of the client 
company, authoritative guidance suggests the auditor may consider the following 
types of items: 
• The nature of revenue sources and major expenditures 
• Products or services and markets 
• Key customers 
• Important suppliers of goods and services 
• Research and development activities and expenditures 
 
You are interested in understanding eduTECH’s warranty reserve. A diligent 
auditor should ask the following types of questions: What might cause warranty 
claims and how are they resolved? How much do warranty claims cost eduTECH? 
How does the research budget compare to the rest of the industry? What are the 
current sources of raw materials, and how do they compare to the industry? 
 
Soon, we will explore a few factors that cause warranty reserve to increase and 
factors that cause warranty reserve to decrease. 
 
You will also need to understand your client’s industry. Understanding an industry 
can help the auditor make difficult judgments regarding the appropriateness of the 
accounting principles applied by the client. For example, an auditor assigned to a 
retail client would want to understand the accounting policies of other companies 
within the retail industry to evaluate whether their client is using similar 
accounting policies. 
 
Authoritative guidance suggests auditors should address certain factors, such as  
industry, regulatory, and other external factors, measurement and review of the 
entity's financial performance, etc., when gaining an understanding of a client and 
its environment. 
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Mental Model, Step 1 (continued): Obtain an Understanding of the Client & 
Industry 
 
As you can imagine, the authoritative guidance just described makes for a lot of 
information for someone to consider, so the professional literature has given some 
guidelines for the types of information that the auditor might want to consider 
gathering. This information includes the following: 
• Industry conditions 
o The market and competition, including demand, capacity, and price 
competition 
o Cyclical or seasonal activity 
o Supply availability and cost 
• Regulatory environment 
o Accounting principles and industry-specific practices 
o Environmental requirements affecting the industry and the entity's 
business 
• Other external factors currently affecting the entity's business 
o General level of economic activity (for example, recession growth) 
o Changes in suppliers’ industries 
 
As the auditor of eduTECH, you would want to consider the information above in 
the following context (for example): (1) the effect of any recent laws or regulations 
focusing on education or electronics, (2) the seasonality of customer demand, (3) the 
existing or forthcoming changes in the market. As you can probably imagine, there 
are countless items to consider, but this should give you an example of the types of 
issues an auditor would want to explore.  
 
One other important point is that the auditor must understand the strategies and 
objectives of the client. This is essential for the auditor to know how the client 
creates value and how its operations could change in the future. 
 
You might be a little overwhelmed by now, but luckily the authoritative literature 
gives us some examples of how this information can be obtained. A few sources are: 
• Inquiries of management and others within the entity 
• Ratio analysis or other analytical tools 
• Observation of the entity's operations and inspection of evidence about 
operations 
• Outside parties, such as the client's legal counsel or valuation experts, 
analysts, banks, or rating agencies 
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[All Participants] 
eduTECH Warranty Reserve Background 
 
As with any technology product, the warranty reserve is an important accounting estimate and a 
critical audit issue. Based on prior period working papers and communications with management 
this year, you know that eduTECH estimates future warranty costs based on the following: 
Historical product failure rates for eduTECH and the tablet industry 
Your carry-forward working papers indicate that the failure rate for similar products across 
the industry has ranged between 2.6% and 5.4% in the first three years of unit life. For the first 
three quarters of the year, the warranty accrual for the e*Tablet was based partially on a 
projected failure rate of 4%, the mid-point of the range. This is consistent with the initial failure 
rates related to the e*Tablet.  
Since the chip manufacturing industry is quite competitive, manufacturers are very tight-lipped 
about their products’ actual failure rate. 
Projected product failure rates during the warranty period 
The DGPU is the part that is most commonly replaced during the first three years of a tablet’s 
life, and if a DGPU is going to fail and be replaced, there is a 50% chance this will happen in the 
first year of use. 
Historical and projected repair costs 
eduTECH outsources the warranty-related repairs of the e*Tablet to a third party, Advanced 
Technology Services (ATS), and pays an amount per unit that is renegotiated each quarter. The 
cost of e*Tablet hardware repairs has increased in recent years, primarily due to the rising, 
demand-driven, costs of tablet DGPUs.  
Knowledge of specific product failures 
eduTECH receives a report of all repairs from ATS fifteen days after the end of each calendar 
quarter. 
Hardware warranty terms include repair or replacement of parts, including labor, for three years 
from the date of purchase. Management frequently reevaluates estimates to assess the adequacy 
of the recorded reserve, and adjusts the amounts as necessary.  
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[Manipulation 2 – Systems-Thinking Prompt] 
 
Mental Model, Step 2: Combining Stocks & Flows into a Mental Model 
 
Next, an auditor should understand how individual stocks and flows, such as 
eduTECH’s warranty reserve, interact with other stocks and flows. 
 
As depicted in the diagram below, management likely monitors the warranty 
reserve balance (stock) and, if it gets too large, they may decide to increase R&D 
in order to fix potential problems with products. As more R&D occurs, it is likely 
that management will slow down its increase of reserves (since better products are 
less likely to fail). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In short, the level of warranty reserves depends, in part, on the level of R&D. The 
level of R&D depends upon the level of warranty reserve. This is called a feedback 
loop. Feedback loops are an important element of mental model development, 
partially because they help identify unexpected relationships. 
 
Notice that the warranty reserves balance directly changes R&D. It also indirectly 
changes R&D through profits. In developing a mental model, it is important to 
understand how indirect relationships work. In this case, they form an indirect 
feedback loop containing multiple stocks and flows. In other cases, a stock may 
never directly interact with warranty reserves, but still impact it through another 
stock. Think about the other things that directly and indirectly affect the 
warranty reserve. 
 
The diagram above is only the beginning of your mental model of eduTECH’s 
warranty reserve, but the information given to you earlier in the case should give 
you plenty of ideas as to how additional links can be made to create a full mental 
model.  
 
Soon you will get your chance to expand and document your mental model. But 
first, there is one more thing to cover – audit-related risks. 
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[Manipulation 2 – Reductionist-Thinking Prompt] 
 
Mental Model, Step 2: Construct a Mental Model of the Operating Environment 
 
The company- and industry-level information previously discussed is used by the 
auditor to construct a mental model of the client and its operating environment.  
 
To illustrate how an auditor uses company and industry related knowledge, 
consider the figure below. In this picture, eduTECH is included in an "economic 
web" that is composed of not only the client, but also other stakeholders such as 
competitors, suppliers, etc. In addition, not only does the auditor need to 
understand the direct relationship that these other entities have on the client 
(bold arrows), but he or she also needs to understand how the interactions 
between these entities can have an indirect effect (dotted arrows). 
 
 
 
For example, suppose that customer complaints are on the rise for a product. This 
can obviously affect your client because it would suggest that, unless they increase 
R&D expenditures or otherwise improve their competitive advantage, competitors 
may begin to cut into your client's market share. 
 
The diagram above is only the beginning of your mental model of eduTECH’s 
warranty reserve, but the information given to you earlier in the case should give 
you plenty of ideas as to how additional links can be made to create a full mental 
model.  
 
Soon you will get your chance to expand and document your mental model. But 
first, there is one more thing to cover – audit-related risks. 
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[All conditions] 
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Mental Model, Step 3: Consider how risks could affect your audit of the client 
 
Next, take a couple of minutes to think about how the following risks impact 
eduTECH’s warranty reserve and, more importantly, how they affect your audit of 
eduTECH’s financial statements. 
 
Business-Related Risks – The auditor uses his or her knowledge of the industry and 
entity to identify business risks – any event or circumstance that threatens the 
client's ability to achieve its objectives. 
 
Audit Risks – Auditing standards also require that auditors understand both 
inherent risk and control risk related to specific financial statement accounts. Think 
of how you might modify your mental model to reflect the following: 
 
• Inherent risk refers to the susceptibility of an assertion to a material 
misstatement before considering internal controls. 
• Control risk is the risk that management’s policies and procedures will not 
prevent or detect a material misstatement on a timely basis. Control risk is a 
function of the effectiveness of the design and operation of internal controls. 
• Auditors combine inherent risk and control risk into their measure of the risk 
of material misstatement. 
 
While internal controls can be implemented to reduce control risk, they do not reduce 
inherent risk, no matter how well they are designed.  
 
For example, assume you have to wake up at 4:30 to make it to an important 
meeting at 7 AM, in another city. You typically don’t wake up until 6:30, so 
inherent factors will prevent you from making that meeting. You implement a 
control, like an alarm clock, to wake you on time. If you are very nervous 
about waking on time, you might implement several controls, including 
setting an alarm on your smart-phone, having a friend call you, moving the 
alarm clock across the room, etc. No matter what you do, though, your 
sleeping habits, potential electricity outages, exhaustion, etc., do not go away. 
Those inherent risks are still there. 
 
Finally, based on the assessed risk of material misstatement, auditors decide how 
much substantive testing to perform. More substantive testing results in lower 
Detection Risk (the risk that the procedures performed by the auditor will not detect 
a potentially material misstatement that actually exists). 
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eduTECH Warranty Reserve Data 
 
The audit team concluded in 2011 and 2012 that eduTECH management’s total estimated 
warranty reserve ($4.0 million in 2011; $7.3 million in 2012) related to the e*Tablet were 
appropriate, and that internal controls in those years were both appropriately designed and 
adequately implemented. The recorded warranty reserve balance as of September 30, 2013 is $25 
million. 
Note to participants: by design, you do not have sufficient information to determine eduTECH’s 
warranty reserve balance. However, you will be given additional details about your audit team’s 
evaluation of this estimate. which should be sufficient information to understand the balance. 
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Your Audit Assignment 
 
It is Monday morning, and you received the following e-mail from the senior manager on the 
eduTECH account. You know that she will be in tomorrow morning, and she’s left you with your 
first assignment for the week – something she will want to discuss with you some time tomorrow. 
The text of the e-mail begins on the page to the right. 
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[Manipulation 1 – Prescriptive Standard] 
 
Hey – thanks for getting things started without me. 
 
Now that the audit is substantially complete, and because the warranty reserve account 
is important and material to our audit, I’d like you to review the team’s documentation 
of all test procedures completed – we really need to get our conclusions right on this 
one. I know you weren’t on the warranty reserve team, so your review will be a “fresh 
set of eyes” for me. 
 
Remember that, for eduTECH, we calculate quantitative materiality as 0.4% of average 
annual revenue. Average annual revenue is about $500 million over the last three 
years, so quantitative materiality was $2 million as of the fiscal year-end, September 
30, 2013. 
 
In general, I’d like you to consider how far off the warranty reserve point estimate must 
be in order to impact eduTECH investors’ judgments.  
 
Tomorrow, after I get settled in, I want to sit with you and get your thoughts related to 
both audit opinions (ICFR and financial statements). Here are a few things for you to 
think about: 
 Think about how you might develop a mental model of the warranty reserve 
process 
 The team has concluded that management’s warranty reserve point estimate 
and estimation uncertainty range are reasonable 
o Note that I do not want you to recalculate the warranty reserve; you 
should rely on the work performed by the team 
 The team has concluded that internal controls are well designed and operating 
as intended 
 
Thanks again for getting started. I’m looking forward to catching up tomorrow. 
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[Manipulation 1 – Judgment-based Standard] 
 
Hey – thanks for getting things started without me. 
 
Now that the audit is substantially complete, and because the warranty reserve account 
is important and material to our audit, I’d like you to review the team’s documentation 
of all test procedures completed – we really need to get our conclusions right on this 
one. I know you weren’t on the warranty reserve team, so your review will be a “fresh 
set of eyes” for me. 
 
Remember that, for eduTECH, we calculate quantitative materiality as 0.4% of average 
annual revenue. Average annual revenue is about $500 million over the last three 
years, so quantitative materiality was $2 million as of the fiscal year-end, September 
30, 2013. 
 
Also remember that materiality is a matter of professional judgment and is influenced 
by the auditor's perception of the needs of users of financial statements. AICPA 
standards recognize that materiality judgments are made in light of surrounding 
circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative considerations 
that might affect investors’ judgments. 
 
We are applying the new (hypothetical) audit standards which tell us that, not only can 
some small errors in estimates can be considered material because of qualitative factors, but 
also some large errors in estimates can be considered NOT material because of qualitative 
factors. 
 
In general, I’d like you to consider how far off the warranty reserve point estimate must 
be in order to impact eduTECH investors’ judgments. 
 
Tomorrow, after I get settled in, I want to sit with you and get your thoughts related to 
both audit opinions (ICFR and financial statements). Here are a few things for you to 
think about: 
 Think about how you might develop a mental model of the warranty reserve 
process 
 The team has concluded that management’s warranty reserve point estimate 
and estimation uncertainty range are reasonable 
o Note that I do not want you to recalculate the warranty reserve; you 
should rely on the work performed by the team 
 The team has concluded that internal controls are well designed and operating 
as intended 
 
Thanks again for getting started. I’m looking forward to catching up tomorrow. 
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[All Participants] 
Preparation for your Meeting with the Senior Manager, Step 1 of 2 
 
You first decide to read through the team’s documentation of all procedures related to warranty 
reserves testing. You will draw out your mental model of the warranty reserve process after you 
read through the working papers.  
During preliminary planning, the following decisions were made regarding the warranty accrual 
account 
 Inherent risk of material misstatement was set “higher than normal” based on the 
substantial judgment associated with the account 
 Control risk, the risk that internal controls will not prevent, detect, or correct a material 
misstatement, was set at the lowest allowable level  
Substantive audit procedures were planned and executed accordingly. 
 
The page to the right contains the notes you took during your review of the working papers, to 
prepare you for your meeting with the senior manager. 
98 
Internal Control Procedures 
 
1. Entity level controls and information technology general controls that might affect the 
warranty reserve were tested and found to be operating effectively. 
2. All tested process-level internal controls were operating as intended as of testing date. The 
audit manager that completed the controls testing in August commented that eduTECH had 
among the best internal controls he’d ever seen and review of the working papers definitely 
supports this. 
 For example, accounting estimates require multiple independent reviews within and 
outside of the Accounting department, and almost always include the use of information 
from outside of eduTECH. 
 In fact, it was management’s internal controls that identified, in the 4th quarter, that gen. 
2 DGPU failures are likely to be between 14% and 26% of all installs (as opposed to the 
industry normal 4%) – the new DGPUs are more likely to overheat during normal use 
than the older model. These internal controls utilized over 20 validated data points to 
identify the most likely point estimate and estimation uncertainty range for warranty 
reserves. 
 The team validated that the warranty reserve currently recorded in the balance 
sheet, $25 million, and the range of estimation uncertainty, $17 million to $33 
million, reflect the information obtained through these highly effective internal 
controls.  
Detailed Substantive Procedures 
 
1. The audit firm’s valuation team completed multiple analyses of management’s assumptions 
and calculations. They also tested various potential scenarios to determine the 
reasonableness of management’s point estimate and the range of estimation uncertainty.  
a. They concluded that management’s range of estimation uncertainty, between $17 
million and $33 million, was reasonable given facts and circumstances.  
b. They also agreed that the midpoint, $25 million, was a reasonable final point estimate 
for the 2013 warranty reserve. This is the amount recorded by management as of the 
end of the fiscal year, September 30, 2013.  
2. Procedures and conclusions in all of the other detailed substantive tests are reasonable and 
consistent with firm standard audit procedures. All of the tests support the reasonableness 
of management’s point estimate and probable range of estimation uncertainty. 
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[Manipulation 2 – Systems-Thinking Prompt] 
Preparation for your Meeting with the Senior Manager, Step 2 of 2 
Taking your senior manager’s advice to heart, you next decide to document your “mental model” 
of eduTECH’s e*Tablet warranty reserve process (i.e., how management determines the 
appropriate year-end balance for the reserve). Take a minute to think about your mental model …. 
Now, use the space below to draw your mental model 
 Certain elements you saw earlier have already been added below 
 Use these to get you started or you can use the last page of the packet to create your own 
 Include additional components of the overall system you think are relevant or necessary 
to help you in evaluating the audit procedures, as well as how those components interact 
 Spend no more than a couple of minutes on this 
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[Manipulation 2 – Reductionist-Thinking Prompt] 
Preparation for your Meeting with the Senior Manager, Step 2 of 2 
Taking your senior manager’s advice to heart, you next decide to document your “mental model” 
of eduTECH’s e*Tablet warranty reserve process (i.e., how management determines the 
appropriate year-end balance for the reserve). Take a minute to think about your mental model …. 
Now, use the space below to draw your mental model. 
 Certain elements you saw earlier have already been added below 
 Use these to get you started or you can use the last page of the packet to create your own 
 Include additional components of the overall system you think are relevant or necessary 
to help you in evaluating the audit procedures, as well as how those components interact 
 Spend no more than a couple of minutes on this 
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1 
Definitely 
materially 
incorrect 
2 3 
Likely 
materially 
incorrect 
4 5 
Likely 
materially 
correct 
6 7 
Definitely 
materially 
correct 
1 
Definitely 
not an 
MW in ICFR 
2 3 
Likely 
NOT an 
MW in ICFR 
4 5 
Likely 
an 
MW in ICFR 
6 7 
Definitely 
an 
MW in ICFR 
Your Meeting with the Senior Manager 
The senior manager has arrived and is ready to find out what you learned in your review. 
Recall that you were asked to think about materiality related to the warranty reserve. You have 
not been asked to estimate the warranty reserve because your audit team has already done 
this, and believes it is fairly stated. 
 
 
Reminder: the warranty reserve balance on September 30, 2013 represents management’s best 
estimate as to the total future warranty expenses for all e*Tablets currently under warranty. 
 
1a. What is the smallest total amount of actual future warranty 
expense such that an eduTECH investor would still consider the 
amount recorded on September 30, 2013 ($25 million), to have 
been materially correct? 
$____________ million 
1b. What is the largest total amount of actual future warranty 
expense such that an eduTECH investor would still consider the 
amount recorded on September 30, 2013 ($25 million), to have 
been materially correct? 
$____________ million 
For each of the following statements, and all similarly formatted questions that follow, please 
place a vertical “slash” (|) through the line at the point that best represents your response. 
2.  To what extent do you believe that the FY2013 (i.e., 9/30/2013) balance in warranty 
reserves, $25 million, is materially correct (i.e., fairly stated)? 
 
3.  To what extent do you believe that there is a material weakness in eduTECH’s ICFR 
related to the FY2013 (i.e., 9/30/2013) balance in warranty reserves? 
 
  
13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
 
Current Balance Sheet amount ($25M) 
 Estimation Error Range ($17M - $33M) 
27 29 31 33 35 37 
(numbers are in $ millions). 
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You have completed Part 1. 
 
Continue the experiment by moving on to the packet labeled “Part 
2” in Envelope 2, and following the instructions within. Please do 
not change your responses on Part 1 after beginning Part 2.
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Part 2: Case Study Continued 
 
 
 
You will now continue the eduTECH case and answer final questions. Please read through 
the following additional information and complete the questions within.  
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Several weeks later … 
 
It is now November 2013 and you are wrapping up open audit procedures, and finalizing working 
papers and conclusions so that the partner can sign off on both opinions for the September 30, 
2013 financial-statements.  
You are beginning your work for the day, when the senior manager arrives with new information. 
You already know that the DGPUs in the gen. 2 e*Tablets are significantly thinner than older 
DGPUs, and more likely to overheat. This fact was discovered by management’s internal controls 
and has been considered in the previously audited warranty reserve balance. 
You now learn, however, that in July 2013, while most of eduTECH’s customers (state and local 
school boards) were on summer vacation, a manufacturer of “smart boards” for K-8 education 
developed an interface to work specifically with the e*Tablet device. Over 80% of eduTech’s 
customers will, beginning in the 2013-14 school year, use these smart boards to project contents 
of the e*Tablet screen onto a large electronic smart board viewable by the entire class. This is 
great news for eduTECH in that the demand for its product will likely increase in the future. 
However, the smart board interface places a greater strain on the DGPU, particularly the new, 
thinner version in the gen. 2 models. This causes a greater likelihood of overheating and, 
therefore, increased warranty claims.  
It is not entirely clear, whether eduTECH could, or should, have known about the smart-board 
manufacturer’s new interface before fiscal year-end. Further, since the interface was created and 
distributed while eduTECH’s customers were mostly on summer vacation, it is unclear as to 
whether e*Tablets were impacted in FY2013, or whether the impact is only in FY2014 and 
beyond. 
The audit firm’s valuation specialists just spoke with the chip manufacturer, the smart board 
manufacturer, and eduTECH management, and completed additional analyses for the reserve. 
It seems that the expected uncertainty range for the warranty expense related to outstanding 
devices, based on this new information, is more likely between $23 million and $39 million (an 
increase from the original estimation error range of $17 million to $33 million). The midpoint of 
the range is $31 million, not the originally estimated $25 million. 
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13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
 
Current Balance Sheet amount ($25M) 
 Estimation Error Range ($17M - $33M) 
27 29 31 33 35 37 
(numbers are in $ millions). 
$31 million is the new estimate for most likely future warranty costs related to currently 
outstanding e*Tablets. Note that this point estimate is also within management’s original 
expected uncertainty range, though it is close to the top of that range. Remember that in 
quantitative terms, tolerable misstatement for warranty reserves was $2 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your senior manager would like your thoughts on the following, before sign-off this week: 
4a.  Based on your understanding of materiality, to what extent do you believe that the 
potential FY2013 (i.e., 9/30/2013) balance for warranty reserves, $31 million, is 
materially different from the currently recorded balance, $25 million,? 
 
 
4b.  Based on your understanding of materiality, if the FY2013 (i.e., 9/30/2013) balance in 
warranty reserves were to remain unchanged at  $25 million (and no disclosure made 
regarding the potential alternate balance), to what extent to you believe that 2013 financial 
statements are materially misstated?  
 
 
5.  To what extent do you believe that there is a material weakness in eduTECH’s ICFR related 
to the FY2013 (i.e., 9/30/2013) balance in warranty reserves? 
 
 
 
Updated estimate of future 
warranty costs ($31M) 
Updated Estimation Error Range 
($23M - $39M) 
 
| 
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6a.  Consider your response to question 4b. Please indicate the extent to which your 
judgment about the absence or presence of a material misstatement of eduTECH’s 
warranty reserve balance is based on: 
 
eduTECH 
Management’s 
ability and 
intelligence 
 
 
 
 
eduTECH 
Management’s 
effort 
 
 
 
 
Warranty 
reserve 
complexity  
 
 
 
 
Luck, or other 
factors outside 
management’s 
influence 
 
 
 
 
 
6b.  Consider your response to question 4b. Please indicate the extent to which your 
judgment about the absence or presence of a material misstatement of eduTECH’s 
warranty reserve balance is based on: 
 
The 
effectiveness of 
eduTECH’s 
internal 
controls 
 
 
 
 
Inherent 
uncertainty in 
the warranty 
reserve process 
 
 
 
 
The 
effectiveness of 
our substantive 
testing  
 
 
 
 
Ensuring our 
compliance 
with audit 
standards 
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7a.  Consider your response to question 5. Please indicate the extent to which your judgment 
about the absence or presence of a material weakness in ICFR for eduTECH’s warranty 
reserve is based on: 
 
eduTECH 
Management’s 
ability and 
intelligence 
 
 
 
 
eduTECH 
Management’s 
effort 
 
 
 
 
Warranty 
reserve 
complexity  
 
 
 
 
Luck, or other 
factors outside 
management’s 
influence 
 
 
 
 
 
7b.  Consider your response to question 5. Please indicate the extent to which your judgment 
about the absence or presence of a material weakness in ICFR for eduTECH’s warranty 
reserve is based on: 
 
The 
effectiveness of 
eduTECH’s 
internal 
controls 
 
 
 
 
Inherent 
uncertainty in 
the warranty 
reserve process 
 
 
 
 
The 
effectiveness of 
our substantive 
testing  
 
 
 
 
Ensuring our 
compliance 
with audit 
standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
1 
Definitely 
did not 
know 
2 3 
Likely 
did not 
know 
4 5 
Likely 
knew 
6 7 
Definitely 
knew 
1 
Definitely 
DO NOT 
understand 
2 3 
Likely 
DO NOT 
understand 
4 5 
Likely 
understand 
6 7 
Definitely 
understand 
1 
Extremely 
NOT 
competent 
2 3 
Somewhat 
NOT 
competent 
4 5 
Somewhat 
competent 
6 7 
Extremely 
competent 
1 
Extremely 
negative 
2 3 
Considerably 
negative 
4 5 
Somewhat 
negative 
6 7 
Not at all 
negative 
1 
Extremely 
dissatisfied 
2 3 
Somewhat 
dissatisfied 
4 5 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
6 7 
Extremely 
satisfied 
Additional Case Questions 
8.  To what extent do you believe eduTECH investors would be satisfied with their investment 
in eduTECH if the warranty reserve balance shifted from $25 million to $31 million? 
 
9. To what extent is the potential shift in warranty reserve balance from $25 million to $31 
million a negative event for the eduTECH investors? 
 
10. To what extent do you believe that eduTECH management knew, before FYE 2013 
(9/30/2013) that the future warranty obligation, $25 million, was likely closer to $31 
million? 
 
 
11. To what extent do you believe eduTECH investors understand the potential investment-
related risks associated with complex accounts like warranty accruals? 
 
 
 
12. How competent would you rate eduTECH’s management to be? 
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Questions about Your Professional Experience 
1. How many months of work experience do you have in audit or assurance services?  
_________ months 
2. How many months of public company audit experience do you have?                         
__________ months 
3. What is your current position or job title (e.g. senior, manager, partner, etc.)?    
__________________ 
4. What industry do you spend most of your time auditing?    
________________________________________ 
5. How familiar are you with the accounting for estimates? 
 
 
 
 
6. How familiar are you with the accounting for warranties? 
 
 
 
 
7. For what proportion of your clients do you participate in discussions of important 
accounting issues with management (e.g., the controller)? 
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Final Questions 
For each of the following statements, please either check () or place a vertical “slash” (|) 
through the line at the point that best represents your response. 
1. In determining planning materiality for eduTECH, I was asked to consider (please select 
one): 
 
A quantitative definition of materiality only (e.g., 0.4% of revenue) 
 A quantitative and qualitative definition of materiality (e.g., 0.4% of revenue 
and both quantitative and qualitative considerations in light of surrounding 
circumstances) 
 
2. The study asked me to think of client’s mental model in terms of: 
 
Stocks and flows, feedback loops, etc. 
 
An “economic web” of the client, competitors, suppliers, customers, etc. 
 
3. Imagine that you discover, after year-end but before financial statements are issued, that a 
client’s financial statement account balance is most likely incorrect by a quantitatively 
material amount. If management’s assumptions used in developing the balance are not 
well supported, to what degree is it true that the account balance must be adjusted, or the 
difference disclosed, before the financial statements are issued? 
 
 
 
 
4. Imagine that you discover, after year-end but before financial statements are issued, that a 
client’s financial statement account balance is most likely incorrect by a quantitatively 
material amount. If management’s assumptions used in developing the balance are well 
supported, to what degree is it true that the account balance must be adjusted, or the 
difference disclosed, before the financial statements are issued?  
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5. It is always bad when a financial statement balance turns out to be quantitatively materially 
different from the audited balance. 
 
 
 
 
6. If a company’s previously audited financial statements were materially misstated, there 
must have been a material weakness in ICFR. 
 
 
 
 
7. Out of 100 public company investors, how many do you suppose recognize that the 
ultimately realized value of some financial statement accounts can range across a span of 
several multiples of planning materiality? 
 
 
 
 
You have completed all materials for the study. 
 
Thank you very much for participating! 
 
Please place all materials back in the main envelope 
and return the entire packet to the experiment 
facilitator. 
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Figure 1: Hypothesis 1 
 
The above figure represents the predicted relation between experimental conditions 
for the difference between participants’ initial material misstatement judgments for 
warranty reserves and their material misstatement judgments after receiving 
additional information suggesting that the initial point estimate and estimation 
uncertainty range were likely quantitatively incorrect. 
Numeric labels [+1, +2, -1, -2] represent the contrast code weights used in testing of 
hypothesis 1. 
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Figure 2: Hypothesis 3 
 
The above figure represents the predicted relation between experimental conditions 
for the difference between participants’ initial ICFR material weakness judgments 
related to warranty reserves and their ICFR material weakness judgments after 
receiving additional information suggesting that the initial point estimate and 
estimation uncertainty range were likely quantitatively incorrect. 
Numeric labels [-2, +3, +1, -2] represent the contrast code weights used in testing of 
hypothesis 3. 
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Figure 3: Case Study Point Estimates and Estimation Error Ranges 
 
 
 
 
The above figure shows the warranty reserve estimate information provided to all participants 
in the experiment. The current balance represents the point estimate and estimation error range 
described as having been audited by the audit team during fieldwork. The updated estimate 
represents the more likely ultimate outcome based on additional information  made available 
after initial testing and conclusions, during the audit wrap-up stage. 
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Figure 4: Systems-Thinking Manipulation – Change over time 
 
The above figure presents the portion of the systems-thinking manipulation that introduced the 
concept that complex systems change over time, a component of the dynamic thinking skill 
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Figure 5: Systems-Thinking Manipulation – Feedback Loops 
 
The above figure presents the portion of the systems-thinking manipulation that introduced 
feedback loops, a component of the closed-loop thinking skill 
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Figure 6: Systems-Thinking Manipulation – Unexpected Events 
 
The above figure presents the portion of the systems-thinking manipulation that introduced the 
potential impact of unexpected events, a component of the generic thinking skill 
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Figure 7: Systems-Thinking Manipulation – Units of Measure 
 
The above figure presents the portion of the systems-thinking manipulation that introduced the 
concept of different units of measure related to a single financial balance, a component of the 
structural thinking skill 
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Figure 8: Systems-Thinking Manipulation – Compare Ambiguously Measured Items 
 
The above figure presents the portion of the systems-thinking manipulation that introduced the skill 
related to the ability to compare things that cannot be unambiguously measured, a component of 
the scientific thinking skill 
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Figure 9: Results for tests of Hypothesis 1 
 
The above figure presents the mean difference between experimental conditions for 
the difference between participants’ initial material misstatement judgments for 
warranty reserves and their material misstatement judgments after receiving 
additional information suggesting that the initial point estimate and estimation 
uncertainty range were likely quantitatively incorrect. 
 
  
1.50 
1.30 
1.86 
1.01 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
Prescriptive 
Standard 
Judgment-Based 
Standard 
R
e
ac
ti
o
n
 t
o
 N
e
w
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
Δ
 in
 J
u
d
ge
d
 M
M
 
  
Reductionist 
Thinkers 
Systems 
Thinkers 
130 
Figure 10: Results for tests of Hypothesis 1 using ANCOVA 
 
The above figure presents the mean difference between experimental conditions for 
participants’ material misstatement judgments after receiving additional information 
suggesting that the initial point estimate and estimation uncertainty range were likely 
quantitatively incorrect, with their initial material misstatement judgments for 
warranty reserves prior to receiving the additional information included as a 
covariate. 
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Figure 11: Conceptual Mediation Model – Material Misstatement 
 
This figure depicts the conceptual mediation model used to test whether the process measures identified in the 
study mediate the hypothesized result. The model shows the potential mediators (together, “understanding the 
role of process complexity”) as mechanisms through which thinking perspective moderates the effect of audit 
standard type on auditor material misstatement judgment, as represented by the contrast hypothesized in H1.  
The three mediation measures used in the analysis are are both causal attribution measures from primary tests 
of H2a and the holistic thinking measure developed to represent correlation in H2b. 
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Figure 12: Results for tests of Hypothesis 3 
 
The above figure presents the mean difference between experimental conditions for 
the difference between participants’ initial ICFR material weakness decisions for 
warranty reserves and their ICFR material weakness decisions after receiving 
additional information suggesting that the initial point estimate and estimation 
uncertainty range were likely quantitatively incorrect and after deciding whether a 
material misstatement likely exists. 
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Tables  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean Change in MM (Standard Deviations) 
a
 
  
Thinking Perspective 
  
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking   
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
N = 28 N = 28 
  
1.50 1.86 
  
(0.31) (0.31) 
  
Judgment-
based 
N = 32 N = 28 
  
1.30 1.01 
  
(0.29) (0.31) 
  
Panel B: Planned contrast coding for H1 and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source df F-Ratio p † 
The difference in material misstatement judgments between 
auditors under prescriptive vs. judgment-based materiality 
standards is greater for auditors in the induced systems-thinking 
perspective than those in the reductionist-thinking perspective 
condition. Contrast weights: [+1, +2, -1, -2] 
1 3.910 0.025 
Follow-up simple effects tests:       
Standard type given systems perspective 1 3.860 0.026 
Standard type given reductionist perspective 1 0.231 0.316 
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel C: Within Subjects Repeated Measures ANOVA 
b
 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Pre-Post 1 116.631 89.771 0.000  
Pre-Post *Standard 1 3.960 3.048 0.042 † 
Pre-Post *Perspective 1 0.017 0.013 0.910  
Pre-Post *Standard*Perspective 1 1.508 1.160 0.142 † 
Error 112 1.299      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 Participants rated the extent to which they believed warranty reserves were materially misstated, on a 7-
point scale anchored on 1 = definitely NOT materially misstated and 7 = definitely materially misstated. 
This was done after they were provided information about an audit client, audit procedures and testing 
conclusions (during regular audit fieldwork), and warranty reserve point estimate and estimation error 
range, then again after receiving new information (during audit wrap-up procedures) suggesting the 
audited information was likely incorrect by a quantitatively material amount. Panel A provides descriptive 
statistics of the change in participant material misstatement judgments between pre- and post-new-
information judgments for each of four randomly assigned experimental conditions. Conditions are based 
on manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit guidance prescription. 
b
 “Pre-Post” represents the relationship between participants’ judgments before receiving new information 
about the warranty reserve balance, and after receiving that information. 
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Table 2: Alternate Tests of Hypothesis 1 – Final Judgment with Initial Judgment 
Covariate 
Panel A: Planned contrast coding for H1 and follow-up simple effects tests 
Source df F-Ratio p † 
The difference in material misstatement judgments between 
auditors under prescriptive vs. judgment-based materiality 
standards is greater for auditors in the induced systems-thinking 
perspective than those in the reductionist-thinking perspective 
condition. Contrast weights: [+1, +2, -1, -2] 
1 2.600 0.055 
Follow-up simple effects tests:       
Standard type given systems perspective 1 2.467 0.060 
Standard type given reductionist perspective 1 0.209 0.325 
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel B: Between Subjects ANCOVA 
b
 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 4.561 2.095 0.076 † 
Perspective 1 0.025 0.011 0.915  
Standard*Perspective 1 1.45 0.666 0.208 † 
Initial Judgment 1 24.151 11.095 0.001  
Error 111 2.177      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 Participants rated the extent to which they believed warranty reserves were materially misstated, on a 7-
point scale anchored on 1 = definitely NOT materially misstated and 7 = definitely materially misstated. 
This was done after they were provided information about an audit client, audit procedures and testing 
conclusions (during regular audit fieldwork), and warranty reserve point estimate and estimation error 
range, then again after receiving new information (during audit wrap-up procedures) suggesting the 
audited information was likely incorrect by a quantitatively material amount. Conditions are based on 
manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit guidance prescription. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Hypothesis 2a a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Causal Attribution Measure (Effort)  
  
Thinking Perspective 
  
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking   
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
N = 28 N = 28 
  
-0.116 -0.344 
  
(0.09) (0.09) 
  
Judgment-based 
N = 32 N = 28 
  
-0.160 -0.281 
  
(0.08) (0.09) 
  
Across 
Standard Type 
N = 60 N = 56 
  
-0.138 -0.312 
  
(0.06) (0.06) 
  
Panel B: ANOVA: Causal Attribution Measure (Effort) 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.003 0.012 0.912  
Perspective 1 0.876 3.958 0.025 † 
Standard*Perspective 1 0.083 0.375 0.542  
Error 112 0.221      
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel C: ANOVA: Causal Attribution Measure (Ability) 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.355 1.359 0.246  
Perspective 1 0.280 1.072 0.152 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 0.014 0.055 0.816  
Error 112 0.261      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 After participants made their final material misstatement decisions, they also indicated the extent to which 
their decisions were based on two internal factors (management’s ability and intelligence, and management’s 
effort) and two external factors (warranty reserve complexity and luck or other factors outside management’s 
influence). Attributions were on 7-point scales anchored on 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “an extreme amount”.  
This table analyzes the ratio between attributions to both effort and ability and the attribution to complexity in 
support of Hypothesis 2a. The natural log of the ratio is used as the measure of relative attribution. Panel A 
provides descriptive statistics of the causal attribution measure of effort-to-complexity for each of the four 
randomly assigned experimental conditions. Conditions are based on manipulations at two levels of thinking 
perspective and two levels of audit standards prescription. 
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Table 4: Tests of Hypothesis 2b a 
Holistic Thinking – correlations between process complexity judgment and 
inherent risk judgment 
b
  
  
Thinking Perspective 
 
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking 
Difference 
(1-tailed p-value)  
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
r = 0.120 r = 0.837 Z = 3.855 
 
p = 0.543 p <  0.001 p <  0.001 
 
Judgment-based 
r = -0.196 r = 0.565 Z = 3.073 
 
p = 0.089 p = 0.002 p = 0.002 
 
Across 
Standard Type 
r = -0.077 r = 0.715 Z = 5.107 
 
p = 0.560 p < 0.001 p <  0.001 
 
a
 After participants made their final material misstatement decisions, they also indicated the extent to 
which their judgments were based on two internal factors (management’s ability and intelligence, and 
management’s effort) and two external factors (warranty reserve complexity and luck or other factors 
outside management’s influence). Attributions were on 7-point scales anchored on 1 = “not at all” and 7 
= “an extreme amount”.  Participants also indicated the extent to which their judgments were based on 
the three factors of the standard audit risk model (control effectiveness, inherent risk, and detection risk). 
This table analyzes the relations between the “warranty reserve complexity” judgments and the “inherent 
risk” judgments in support of Hypothesis 2b.  
b 
This table details the Pearson correlations between participants’ “warranty reserve complexity” 
judgments and “inherent risk” judgments in each of four randomly assigned experimental conditions. 
Conditions are based on manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit 
standards prescription. The difference between reductionist-thinkers’ and systems-thinkers’ judgments 
are tested by calculating the Fischer Z-score for the difference in correlations. Given the directional 
prediction for the difference in correlations, the p-values in the “Difference” column of this panel are 
one-tailed (others in the panel are two-tailed). 
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Table 5: Tests of Mediation for Hypothesis 1 
Panel A: Regression Models for difference in material misstatement  
a
 
  
Total Effects Model  Full Direct Effects Model 
 
Source 
 
Coefficient p   Coefficient p  
 
Intercept 1.420 0.000  1.347 0.000 
 
Standard -0.262 0.042 
† 
0.077 0.345 
† 
Perspective -0.017 0.910 
 
-0.011 0.941 
 
Standard*Perspective 0.161 0.142 
† 
0.113 0.228 
† 
Causal Attribution (effort) 
  
 
-0.731 0.057 
† 
Causal Attribution (ability) 
  
 
0.570 0.087 
† 
Standard* Causal Attribution (effort) 
 
 0.987 0.034  
Standard* Causal Attribution (ability) 
 
 0.065 0.876  
Holistic Thinking 
 
 0.871 0.053 
†
 
Standard* Holistic Thinking 
 
 -0.819 0.129  
  † - one-tailed 
Panel B:Changes to planned contrast coding after including mediators 
b
 
  
Total Effects Model  
Full Direct Effects 
Model 
 
Source 
 
Coefficient p   Coefficient p  
 
H1 Contrast weights: 
[+1, +2, -1, -2] 
Direct effect of the interaction on 
change in material misstatement 
judgment 
1.893 0.025 
†
 1.467 0.064 
† 
Indirect effect through the mediators 
  
 
0.426 
 
 
Percent of effect mediated 
  
 
22.5% 
 
 
  † - one-tailed 
a
 The Total Effects model on the left describes the results of ordinary least squares regression for the 
primary (H1) model. The Full Direct Effects Models on the right include results of a model containing the 
mediator variables described in the text. In these models, the Materiality Standard condition variable is 
interacted with the Perspective condition variable and each potential mediator variable. In the statistical 
model, reductionist-thinkers    and systems-thinkers    ; guideline based standards    and 
prescriptive standards    . 
b 
The Total Effects columns in Panel B replicate the primary analysis for H1. The Full Direct Effect 
columns provide the coefficient and significance of the test of planned contrast (from H1) after the 
mediators have been included in the model (first row of Panel B), and the indirect effects through the 
mediators (second row).
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVAs for Initial and Final Material 
Misstatement Decisions a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean MM (Standard Deviations) 
  
Initial MM Decision 
 
Final MM Decision 
  
Thinking Perspective 
 
Thinking Perspective 
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking 
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
N = 28 N = 28 
 
N = 28 N = 28 
3.52 3.25 
 
5.03 5.11 
(0.21) (0.21) 
 
(0.29) (0.29) 
Judgment-
based 
N = 32 N = 28 
 
N = 32 N = 28 
3.57 3.63 
 
4.87 4.64 
(0.20) (0.21) 
 
(0.27) (0.29) 
     
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA: Initial MM Decision 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 1.291 1.014 0.158 
†
 
Perspective 1 0.336 0.264 0.609  
Standard*Perspective 1 0.808 0.634 0.427 
†
 
Error 112 1.274      
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel C: ANOVA: Final MM Decision 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 2.815 1.186 0.139 † 
Perspective 1 0.157 0.066 0.798  
Standard*Perspective 1 0.702 0.296 0.294 † 
Error 112 2.373      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 Participants rated the extent to which they believed warranty reserves were materially misstated, on a 7-
point scale anchored on 1 = definitely NOT materially misstated and 7 = definitely materially misstated. 
This was done after they were provided information about an audit client, audit procedures and testing 
conclusions (during regular audit fieldwork), and warranty reserve point estimate and estimation error 
range, then again after receiving new information (during audit wrap-up procedures) suggesting the 
audited information was likely incorrect by a quantitatively material amount.  
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Table 7: Ability, Effort, and Complexity Attributions for Material Misstatement a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean Attributions (Standard Deviations) 
 
Ability 
 
Effort  Complexity 
Judgment-based*  
Reductionist-thinking 
(N = 32) 
3.73 
 
4.05  4.74 
(0.23) 
 
(0.23)  (0.24) 
Judgment-based*  
Systems-thinking 
(N = 28) 
3.46 
 
3.70  4.75 
(0.25) 
 
(0.25)  (0.25) 
Prescriptive*  
Reductionist-thinking 
(N = 28) 
3.82 
 
4.09  4.54 
(0.25) 
 
(0.25)  (0.25) 
Prescriptive*  
Systems-thinking 
(N = 28) 
3.64 
 
3.51  4.82 
(0.25) 
 
(0.25)  (0.25) 
Panel B: ANOVA: Attribution to Ability 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.495 0.291 0.591  
Perspective 1 1.434 0.844 0.180 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 0.056 0.033 0.856  
Error 112 2.373      
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel C: ANOVA: Attribution to Effort 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.177 0.103 0.748  
Perspective 1 6.224 3.63 0.030 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 0.356 0.207 0.650  
Error 112 1.715      
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel D: ANOVA: Attribution to Complexity 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.128 0.071 0.790  
Perspective 1 0.601 0.334 0.282 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 0.522 0.29 0.591  
Error 112 1.799      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 Participants indicated the extent to which their final MM decisions were based on management’s ability and 
intelligence, management’s effort, warranty reserve complexity, and luck or other factors outside 
management’s influence. Attributions were on 7-point scales from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “an extreme amount”.  
This table summarizes attributions to effort, ability, and complexity in support of Hypothesis 2a. Conditions 
are based on manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit standards prescription. 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Hypothesis 3 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean Change in MW (Standard Deviations) 
a
 
  
Thinking Perspective 
  
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking   
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
N = 28 N = 28 
  
0.88 0.88 
  
(0.23) (0.23) 
  
Judgment-
based 
N = 32 N = 28 
  
0.70 0.93 
  
(0.22) (0.23) 
  
Panel B: Planned contrast coding for H3 
Source df F-Ratio p † 
Auditors are more likely to conclude that a material weakness in 
ICFR exists when they are reductionist-thinkers than when they 
are systems-thinkers, and reductionist-thinkers are more likely to 
conclude that a material weakness in ICFR exists under 
prescriptive audit standards than under judgment-based 
standards. Contrast weights: [+3, -2, +1, -2] 
1 0.087 0.384 
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel C: Within Subjects Repeated Measures ANOVA 
b
 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Pre-Post 1 41.251 53.818 0.000  
Pre-Post *Standard 1 0.132 0.086 0.770  
Pre-Post *Perspective 1 0.400 0.261 0.306 
†
 
Pre-Post *Standard*Perspective 1 0.353 0.23 0.632  
Error 112 1.533      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 Participants rated the extent to which they believed there existed a material weakness in ICFR related to 
warranty reserves, on a 7-point scale anchored on 1 = definitely NOT an MW in ICFR and 7 = definitely an 
MW in ICFR. This was done after they were provided information about an audit client, audit procedures 
and testing conclusions (during regular audit fieldwork), and warranty reserve point estimate and estimation 
error range, then again after receiving new information (during audit wrap-up procedures) suggesting the 
audited information was likely incorrect by a quantitatively material amount. Panel A provides descriptive 
statistics of the change in participant material weakness decisions between pre- and post-new-information 
decisions for each of four randomly assigned experimental conditions. Conditions are based on 
manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit guidance prescription. 
b
 “Pre-Post” represents the relationship between participants’ judgments before receiving new information 
about the warranty reserve balance, and after receiving that information. 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVAs for Initial and Final ICFR Material 
Weakness Decisions a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean MW (Standard Deviations) 
  
Initial MW Decision 
 
Final MW Decision 
  
Thinking Perspective 
 
Thinking Perspective 
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking 
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
N = 28 N = 28 
 
N = 28 N = 28 
3.45 2.95 
 
4.33 3.83 
(0.22) (0.22) 
 
(0.27) (0.27) 
Judgment-
based 
N = 32 N = 28 
 
N = 32 N = 28 
3.16 2.97 
 
3.86 3.90 
(0.21) (0.22) 
 
(0.25) (0.27) 
     
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA: Initial MW Decision 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.512 0.368 0.545  
Perspective 1 3.451 2.484 0.059 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 0.69 0.496 0.483  
Error 112 1.389      
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel C: ANOVA: Final MW Decision 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 1.164 0.563 0.455  
Perspective 1 1.501 0.726 0.198 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 2.029 0.981 0.324  
Error 112 2.069      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 Participants rated the extent to which they believed an ICFR material weakness exists in warranty 
reserves, on a 7-point scale anchored on 1 = definitely NOT an MW in ICFR and 7 = definitely an MW in 
ICFR. This was done after they were provided information about an audit client, audit procedures and 
testing conclusions (during regular audit fieldwork), and warranty reserve point estimate and estimation 
error range, then again after receiving new information (during audit wrap-up procedures) suggesting the 
audited information was likely incorrect by a quantitatively material amount.  
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Table 10: ANOVAs: Material Weakness Given Material Misstatement a 
Panel A: ANOVA: Changes to Material Weakness Decision 
b 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio P 
†
   
Standard 1 0.012 0.008 0.929  
Perspective 1 0.208 0.139 0.710  
Change in MM (3 levels) 2 4.353 2.897 0.060  
Standard*Perspective 1 0.502 0.334 0.565  
Standard* Change in MM 2 0.751 0.5 0.608  
Perspective*Change in MM 2 1.576 1.049 0.354  
Standard*Perspective*Change in MM 2 0.879 0.585 0.559  
Error 104 1.503      
   
† - two-tailed 
Panel B: ANOVA: Final Material Weakness Decision 
c 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio P 
†
   
Standard 1 0.613 0.329 0.568  
Perspective 1 1.382 0.741 0.391  
Final MM (3 levels) 2 15.973 8.561 < 0.001  
Standard*Perspective 1 3.257 1.746 0.189  
Standard* Final MM 2 0.856 0.459 0.633  
Perspective*Final MM 2 0.219 0.118 0.889  
Standard*Perspective*Final MM 2 0.519 0.278 0.758  
Error 104 1.866      
   
† - two-tailed 
a
 Participants rated the extent to which they believed an ICFR material weakness exists in warranty reserves, on 
a 7-point scale anchored on 1 = definitely NOT an MW in ICFR and 7 = definitely an MW in ICFR. This was 
done after they were provided information about an audit client, audit procedures and testing conclusions 
(during regular audit fieldwork), and warranty reserve point estimate and estimation error range, then again 
after receiving new information (during audit wrap-up procedures) suggesting the audited information was 
likely incorrect by a quantitatively material amount.  
b 
Panel A shows an ANOVA similar to the primary test of H3, with the additional independent variable, Change 
in Material Misstatement, which is derived from participants’ response to the extent to which they believed 
warranty reserves were materially misstated, on a 7-point scale anchored on 1 = definitely NOT materially 
misstated and 7 = definitely materially misstated. This questions was asked after they were provided 
information about an audit client, audit procedures and testing conclusions (during regular audit fieldwork), 
and warranty reserve point estimate and estimation error range, then again after receiving new information 
(during audit wrap-up procedures) suggesting the audited information was likely incorrect by a quantitatively 
material amount. The difference between initial and final responses were ranked in 3 categories, small, 
medium, and large changes to MM for purposes of this test.  
c 
 Using the same question about the extent to which participants believed warranty reserves were materially 
misstated, but using only the final decision, Panel B evaluates the effect of final material misstatement as well 
as the two manipulated variables on participants’ final material weakness decision. 
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Hypothesis 4a a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Causal Attribution Measure  
  
Causal Attribution (Ability) 
 
Causal Attribution (Effort) 
  
Thinking Perspective 
 
Thinking Perspective 
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking 
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
N = 28 N = 28 
 
N = 28 N = 28 
-0.07 -0.30 
 
-0.02 -0.33 
(0.10) (0.10) 
 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Judgment-
based 
N = 32 N = 28 
 
N = 32 N = 28 
-0.09 -0.21 
 
-0.01 -0.20 
(0.09) (0.10) 
 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Across 
Standard 
Type 
N = 60 N = 56 
 
N = 60 N = 56 
-0.08 -0.25 
 
-0.01 -0.20 
(0.07) (0.07) 
 
(0.09) (0.10) 
     
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA: Causal Attribution Measure (Ability) 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.030 0.112 0.739  
Perspective 1 0.910 3.392 0.068  
Standard*Perspective 1 0.081 0.301 0.584  
Error 112 0.268      
   
All p-values are two-tailed 
Panel C: ANOVA: Causal Attribution Measure (Effort) 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.144 0.504 0.479  
Perspective 1 1.848 6.483 0.012  
Standard*Perspective 1 0.105 0.369 0.545  
Error 112 0.285      
   
All p-values are two-tailed 
a
 After participants made their final material weakness decisions, they also indicated the extent to which their 
decisions were based on two internal factors (management’s ability and intelligence, and management’s 
effort) and two external factors (warranty reserve complexity and luck or other factors outside management’s 
influence). Attributions were on 7-point scales anchored on 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “an extreme amount”.  
This table analyzes the ratio between attributions to both effort and ability and the attribution to complexity in 
support of Hypothesis 4a. The natural log of the ratio is used as the measure of relative attribution. Panel A 
provides descriptive statistics of the causal attribution measures of ability-to-complexity and effort-to-
complexity for each of the four randomly assigned experimental conditions. Conditions are based on 
manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit standards prescription. 
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Table 12: Tests of Hypothesis 4b a 
Panel A: Holistic Thinking – correlations between judgments of 
management ability and internal controls effectiveness 
b
  
  
Thinking Perspective 
 
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking 
Difference 
(1-tailed p-value)  
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
r = 0.481 r = 0.712 Z = 1.297 
 
p = 0.010 p <  0.001 p = 0.100 
 
Judgment-based 
r = 0.454 r = 0.570 Z = 0.578 
 
p <  0.001 p = 0.002 p = 0.283 
 
Across Standard 
Type 
r = 0.459 r = 0.661 Z = 1.565 
 
p <  0.001 p < 0.001 p = 0.060 
 
Panel B: Holistic Thinking – correlations between judgments of 
management effort and internal controls effectiveness 
  
Thinking Perspective 
 
  
Reductionist-
thinking 
Systems-
thinking 
Difference 
(1-tailed p-value)  
Materiality 
Standard 
Type 
Prescriptive 
r = 0.257 r = 0.512 Z = 1.070 
 
p = 0.186 p = 0.005 p = 0.145 
 
Judgment-based 
r = 0.653 r = 0.612 Z = -0.251 
 
p = 0.009 p = 0.001 p = 0.401 
 
Across Standard 
Type 
r = 0.485 r = 0.562 Z = 0.557 
 
p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p = 0.289 
 
a
 After participants made their final material weakness decisions, they also indicated the extent to which 
their judgments were based on two internal factors (management’s ability and intelligence, and 
management’s effort) and two external factors (warranty reserve complexity and luck or other factors 
outside management’s influence). Attributions were on 7-point scales anchored on 1 = “not at all” and 7 
= “an extreme amount”.  Participants also indicated the extent to which their judgments were based on 
the three factors of the standard audit risk model (control effectiveness, inherent risk, and detection risk). 
This table analyzes the relations between the management “ability” and “effort” judgments and the 
“control effectiveness” judgments in support of Hypothesis 4b.  
b 
This table details the Pearson correlations between participants’ “management ability/effort” judgments 
and “inherent risk” judgments in each of four randomly assigned experimental conditions. Conditions are 
based on manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit standards 
prescription. The difference between reductionist-thinkers’ and systems-thinkers’ judgments are tested 
by calculating the Fischer Z-score for the difference in correlations. Given the directional prediction for 
the difference in correlations, the p-values in the “Difference” column of this panel are one-tailed (others 
in the panel are two-tailed). 
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Table 13: Ability, Effort, and Complexity Attributions for Material Weakness a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Mean Attributions (Standard Deviations) 
 
Ability 
 
Effort  Complexity 
Judgment-based*  
Reductionist-thinking 
(N = 32) 
4.15 
 
4.42  4.37 
(0.26) 
 
(0.26)  (0.22) 
Judgment-based*  
Systems-thinking 
(N = 28) 
4.20 
 
4.23  4.88 
(0.27) 
 
(0.28)  (0.24) 
Prescriptive*  
Reductionist-thinking 
(N = 28) 
4.29 
 
4.53  4.64 
(0.27) 
 
(0.28)  (0.24) 
Prescriptive*  
Systems-thinking 
(N = 28) 
3.56 
 
3.40  4.58 
(0.27) 
 
(0.28)  (0.24) 
Panel B: ANOVA: Attribution to Ability 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 1.829 0.869 0.353  
Perspective 1 3.288 1.562 0.107 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 4.265 2.027 0.157  
Error 112 2.104      
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel C: ANOVA: Attribution to Effort 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 3.733 1.735 0.191  
Perspective 1 12.566 5.839 0.009 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 6.46 3.002 0.086  
Error 112 2.152      
   
† - one-tailed 
Panel D: ANOVA: Attribution to Complexity 
Source  df 
Mean 
Squares F-Ratio p   
Standard 1 0.005 0.003 0.957  
Perspective 1 1.437 0.911 0.171 
†
 
Standard*Perspective 1 2.268 1.438 0.233  
Error 112 1.577      
   
† - one-tailed 
a
 Participants indicated the extent to which their final MW decisions were based on management’s ability and 
intelligence, management’s effort, warranty reserve complexity, and luck or other factors outside 
management’s influence. Attributions were on 7-point scales from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “an extreme amount”.  
This table summarizes attributions to effort, ability, and complexity in support of Hypothesis 4a. Conditions 
are based on manipulations at two levels of thinking perspective and two levels of audit standards prescription. 
 
